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1 See infra TAN__ and TAN __.
2 As evidence of this obsession, the period 2007-2008 will witness publication of three
prominent works on preemption: Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve, Federal Preemption:
States Powers, National Interests (AEI Press, 2007); Thomas O. McGarrity, The Preemption War
(Yale, forthcoming 2008); William Buzbee ed., Preemption Choice: The Theory, Law, and Reality
of Preemption’s Core Questions (Cambridge Press, forthcoming 2008), in addition to numerous
articles on the topic from a variety of perspectives (empirical, doctrinal, historical).
3  See, e.g., Department of Health & Human Servs., FDA, Requirements on Content and
Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and Biological Prods., 71 Fed. Reg. 3922 (Jan.
24, 2006) (FDA rule on drug labeling stating in its preamble that FDA’s approval of a prescription
drug label preempts not just state regulations but also state tort law and court decisions in product
liability cases.);  Final Rule: Standard for the Flammability (Open Flame) of Mattress Sets, 71 Fed.
Reg. 13472 (Mar. 15, 2006), codified at 16 C.F.R. §§ 1633.1 et. seq. (2007) (Consumer Products
Safety Administration rule on mattress safety stating in its preamble that the standard would
preempt state rules and court decisions); 12 C.F.R. § 5.34(e) (2006) (Office for the Comptroller of
the Currency rule stating in effect that state supervision of state-chartered subsidiaries of national
banks is preempted, discussed infra at notes __-__ and accompanying text); Federal Motor Vehicle
Safety Standards; Roof Crush Resistance, 70 Fed. Reg. 49,223 (2005) (Proposed rule for improving
roof strength performance in rollover crashes, issued by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
(NHTSA), containing a provision preempting state tort suits where the vehicle meets the government
standard.);  Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards, 71 Fed. Reg. 78,276 (Dec. 28, 2006) (to be codified
at 6 C.F.R. 27.405(a)) (proposed Homeland Security regulation on chemical security stating that it would
preempt conflicting state laws, though noting that preemption had been controversial in Congress’s debates
1
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AS THE NEW FEDERALISM
Gillian E. Metzger*
Few doubt the tremendous impact the modern national administrative state
has had on our federal system.  Congress and the president have long
acknowledged the relationship between federalism and administrative
government, incorporating the states as central players in major federal regulatory
schemes.1  Scholars, too, have taken heed.  In particular, federalism scholarship’s
growing obsession with preemption has underscored the effect of federal
administrative action on the states.2  Recent aggressive efforts by federal agencies
to preempt state law, particularly state tort law, have brought to the fore the
crucial link between federalism and administrative government.3   
on chemical security).  A number of recent articles have discussed these regulations.  See, e.g., 
William Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the Floor/Ceiling Distinction,
82 NYU L. Rev. 1547, 1573-5 (2007); Catherine A. Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble, Federal
Agencies and the Federalization of Tort Law, 56 DePaul L. Rev. 227 (2007).  These regulations
led to a recent Senate hearing on preemption.  See Regulatory Preemption: Are Federal Agencies
Usurping Congressional and State Authority: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, 110th Cong. (September 12, 2007). 
4   See, e.g., Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79
Tex. l. Rev. 1321 (2001); Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472 (1995)[due process and federalism]
5 See Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court’s Two Federalisms, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 133
(2004).
6 See, e.g., Nina A. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 737 (2004);
Richard A. Nagareda, FDA Preemption: When Tort Law Meets the Administrative State, 1 J. Tort
L. 1 (2006); Catherine M. Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble: Federal Agencies and the
Federalization of Tort Law, 56 DePaul L. Rev. 227 (2007); Catherine M. Sharkey, Products
Liability Preemption: An Institutional Approach, 76 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2008); see
infra Part II.C; see also Chevron U.S.A Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 843-44 (1984) (instructing courts to defer to a reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous
statute by the agency charged with implementing it).
2
It is therefore interesting that the relationship between federalism and
administrative law remains strangely inchoate and unanalyzed.  Administrative
law’s constitutional dimensions—in particular, doctrines of separation of powers
and procedural due process—are generally recognized to have significant
federalism implications.4  But more run-of-the-mill administrative law
concerns—such as whether an agency adequately followed required procedures,
engaged in reasoned decisionmaking, or deserves deference for its statutory
interpretations—are rarely approached through a federalism lens.  This is all the
more surprising given the current focus on preemption, because despite their
importance to our system of federalism, preemption determinations are
understood as turning on questions of statutory interpretation rather than
constitutional law.5  To be sure, the current preemption focus has sparked much
discussion of the extent to which administrative agencies should be able to
determine the preemptive scope of federal law.  Yet few legal scholars have gone
beyond this administrative preemption debate to consider the broader relationship
between federalism and administrative law, and within this debate federalism and
administrative law are often portrayed as in considerable tension.6   
Recent Supreme Court case law suggests that the blinders to the
relationship of federalism and administrative law may be lifting.  In a number of
decisions, the Court has demonstrated its unwillingness to impose significant
constitutional limits on the substantive scope of Congress’s regulatory powers. 
Yet it has also indicated that federalism concerns with protecting the states’
7 As I use the term “federalism” or “federalism concerns” in this Article, I mean to refer
to institutional interests of states in exercising the power to govern.  See infra TAN __ (intro to
III.B)).
8  On the Court’s docket for this Term are two cases addressing the preemptive effect of
federal administrative determinations this Term, Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc. and Lambert v. Kent. 
See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 451 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2006), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 3000 (June 25, 2007)
(No. 06-179); Desiano v. Warner-Lambert & Co., 467 F.3d 85, 91 (2d Cir. 2006) cert. granted sub nom.
Warner-Lambert Co. v. Kent, 128 S. Ct. 31 (Sept. 25, 2007) (No. 06-1498).  In addition, next Term the
Court will hear another preemption case, Wyeth v. Levine, which raises the additional question of
how much deference is due a federal agency’s interpretation of its decisions’ preemptive effect. 
See Levine v. Wyeth, 2006 Vt. 107 (2006), cert. granted sub nom Wyeth v. Levine, 76 U.S.L.W. 3391 (U.S.
Jan. 18, 2008) (No. 06-1249)
3
independent regulatory role nonetheless retain traction.7  The means by which the
Court appears to be addressing such concerns, however, is administrative law. 
Acting ostensibly through the rubric of standard administrative law doctrines,
such as reasoned decisionmaking requirements and the Mead/Chevron/Skidmore
framework for review of agency statutory interpretations, the Court has ensured
that the impact of challenged agency decisions on the states is considered.  As a
result, administrative law may be becoming the new federalism.
These moves towards transforming administrative law into a surrogate for
federalism remain largely undeveloped.  So far, the Court has failed to articulate a
coherent account of how federalism and administrative law should be integrated;
it has even failed to acknowledge that such an account may be needed or
explicitly viewed its recent efforts in this light.  Suggestions that administrative
law may be the new federalism are present in only a handful of decisions, too few
to draw any reliable inferences of a new doctrinal trend.  Moreover, all of these
decisions were highly contentious and may turn out to be essentially fact-
dependent and result-driven.  At a minimum, however, the Court appears to be
increasingly aware of administrative law’s importance to constitutional
federalism.  That increased awareness is also attested to by the Court’s granting
certiorari in several cases potentially implicating the role that federal
administrative determinations should play in preemption challenges.8  Exploring
the relationship between federalism and administrative law is particularly useful
at this early juncture, when the Court’s jurisprudence on the question is still in a
formative state. 
My aim in this article is twofold: first, to explore how the Court may be
employing administrative law as a surrogate for constitutional federalism; and
second, to assess how well administrative law performs this surrogacy role and
how the Court should approach the relationship between federalism and
administrative law.  I conclude that administrative law has important federalism-
reinforcing features, but that the Court’s decisions to date have failed to fully
develop administrative law’s federalism potential.  I also argue that the best
approach—not only for the functioning of federal agencies but, critically, for the
continued vibrancy of federalism in the world of the modern federal
9 [Author note: this quintet may become a sextet when the Supreme Court issues its
decision in Riegel.]
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administrative state—is for the Court (and Congress and the President) to advance
federalism within the overall rubric of administrative law, rather than to treat
federalism as a more absolute restriction on agency action absent express
congressional authorization.
The article consists of four parts.  Part I contains an analysis of recent
Supreme Court precedent, focusing in particular on five decisions addressing the
intersection of federalism and administrative law.  Part II advances the claim that
administrative law may be becoming the new federalism.  Here I contend that the
Court is unwilling to curb Congress on federalism grounds and that federalism
concerns instead are being incorporated into administrative law.  I then examine
two ways in which federalism concerns are being addressed through an
administrative law framework:  application of ordinary administrative law to the
benefit of the states and development of more extraordinary federalism-inspired
administrative law analyses.  I also discuss the current administrative preemption
debate, which I contend approaches the relationship between federalism and
administrative law in overly narrow terms, emphasizing the conflict between
federalism and administrative law rather than their potential synergies.
Part III switches to a more normative and theoretical perspective.  I begin
with an analysis of whether using administrative law as a surrogate for federalism
concerns is a legitimate judicial undertaking.  I conclude that it is, and underscore
the benefits of the administrative law approach over other subconstitutional
federalism doctrines.  I then examine whether, even if legitimate, using
administrative law as a surrogate for federalism concerns is likely to prove
effective.  In addition to rejecting claims that administrative agencies are
categorically ill-suited to protecting state regulatory autonomy, I emphasize the
need to distinguish between agencies and administrative law.  In that vein, I argue
that three features of administrative law reinforce its federalism potential:  its
procedural mechanisms, in particular notice-and-comment rulemaking; its
doctrinal and institutional capaciousness; and its very status as subconstitutional
law.  
Part IV assesses the implications of this analysis of administrative law’s
federalism potential.  One implication is that the Court should employ
administrative law with an eye to reinforcing agencies’ sensitivity and
responsiveness to state interests.  A second is that federalism concerns raised by
federal agency action may be best advanced through ordinary administrative law,
albeit with express recognition of how state interests factor into judicial review. 
Although the Court’s recent decisions make some helpful steps in this direction,
their lack of clarity and reflection on how federalism concerns should factor into
application of administrative law limit their generative potential.
I.  A FEDERALISM AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW QUINTET9
10  For examples of the Court’s continuing obsession with Chevron, see Long Island Care
at Home v. Coke, 127 S. Ct. 2339 (2007), Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet
Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005); Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212 (2002).  Of course, the Court also
issued decisions on other administrative law questions in this period, such as procedural due
process, Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 202 (2005); Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S.
748 (2005), and access to judicial review, Wilkie v. Robbins, 127 S. Ct. 2588 (2007), Tenet v.
Doe, 544 U.S. 1 (2005). 
11 540 U.S. 461 (2004).
12 546 U.S. 243 (2006).
13 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007).
14 A fourth decision that might be included in this category is Rapanos v. United States,
126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006).  There, in rejecting the Army Corps of Engineers’s view of its jurisdiction
under the Clean Water Act (CWA) as too broad, the plurality opinion by Justice Scalia emphasized
that “the Corps’ interpretation stretches the outer limits of Congress’s commerce power” and
intrude on “‘the States’ traditional and primary power over land and water use’” by “authoriz[ing]
the Corps to serve as a de facto regulator of immense stretches of intrastate land.”  Id. at 2224
(quoting Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook Cty v. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159,
174 (2001).   The plurality relied on these federalism concerns to justify its refusal to defer to the
Corps’ statutory interpretation under Chevron, emphasizing that it “would expect a clearer
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Federalism and administrative law are an unfamiliar couple, particularly in
Supreme Court precedent.  Although the Court regularly decides cases involving
one or the other of these topics, and both are sometimes present in cases before it,
for the most part the two remain doctrinally and analytically separate.  But in five
recent highly-charged decisions, issued over a several-year period, the
relationship of federalism and administrative law has repeatedly risen to the fore.  
Most prominently this has taken the form of an injection of federalism into
administrative law challenges of federal agency action.  Yet the reverse has also
occurred, with administrative law surfacing in more straightforward federalism
challenges.   This quintet of decisions is particularly worthy of study for insights
into the Court’s growing awareness of the intersection between federalism and
administrative law. 
A. Federalism’s Appearance in Administrative Law Challenges
Challenges to actions by federal agencies are, of course, a regular staple of
the Court’s docket.  In recent years, the Court’s administrative law jurisprudence
has focused overwhelmingly on determining agency statutory interpretations
should receive Chevron deference.10  The three federal agency challenges
discussed below—Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation (ADEC) v.
EPA,11 Gonzales v. Oregon,12 and Massachusetts v. EPA,13—all share that focus,
in that they involve challenges to agency interpretations of governing statutes.14  
statement from Congress to authorize an agency theory of jurisdiction that presses the envelope of
constitutional validity.”  Id. at 2224–25; see also id.(emphasizing that Congress’s policy in the
CWA intended to have the states play the primary role in pollution reduction and regulating use of
land and water resources).  Yet the extent to which the plurality opinion in Rapanos actually rests
on federalism concerns is unclear.  The opinion also contended that the Corps’ interpretation was
contrary to the text of the CWA, and Justice Scalia’s invocation of federalism at the end of the
opinion has an air of gilding the lily.  See id. at 2220–23.  In addition, Chief Justice Roberts
argued in his concurrence that had EPA and the Corps gone forward with a proposed rulemaking
on the jurisdictional question, their views of the CWA’s “broad [and] somewhat ambiguous” terms
would have been entitled to deference—suggesting that federalism was not that central to his view
of the case either.  Id. at 2235–36.  In any event, Justice Kennedy dismissed the plurality’s
invocation of the avoidance canon on federalism grounds, see id. at 2246-27, 2249-50, and his vote
concurring in the judgment was determinative of the result in the case.
15 42 U.S.C. §§ 7475(a)(1), (4); § 7479(1); see generally 540 U.S. at 472.
16 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (state responsibility in implementing the CAA); 42 U.S.C. § 7661a
(procedure for delegating permitting authority to states); 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3) (giving authority to
make BACT determinations to the permitting authority)
17 540 U.S. at 469.
18 Id. at 487–88.
6
What differentiates them—aside from being high profile, very contentious
decisions—is the degree to which members of the Court invoked federalism
concerns in determining whether to uphold the challenged agency action.
1.  Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation (ADEC) v. EPA.  
The first decision in this series, ADEC, was issued in 2004 and involved the
EPA’s implementation of the Clean Air Act (CAA).  Under the CAA, no source
emitting more than 250 tons of nitrogen oxides a year can be constructed or
modified without obtaining a permit, and no permit can be issued unless the
facility uses the “best available control technology [BACT]” for each CAA
pollutant it emits.15  States can obtain permitting authority from EPA, and if so
have primary responsibility for implementing the CAA within their territory,
including responsibility for issuing permits and making BACT determinations.16
The question in ADEC was whether EPA had authority to supervise a
state’s BACT determinations.  EPA read the CAA as granting it authority to block
construction of a facility permitted by a state when it determined that the state’s
BACT determination was unreasonable.17  In a 5-4 decision, the Court agreed,
arguing that EPA’s interpretation, although “not qualify[ing] for the dispositive
force described in Chevron” because only promulgated in internal guidance
memoranda lacking the force of law, “‘nevertheless warrants respect.’”18  The
Court further upheld EPA’s conclusion that the state environmental agency had
19 Id at 496–502.
20 Id. at 517.  
21 Id. at 518.
22 Id. at 490-91, 495.  The facts of the case offer support for the majority’s view.  The
CAA clearly assigned the EPA an oversight role regarding state permitting decisions and
implementation decisions, and no one disputed that EPA had authority to prohibit a facility’s
construction or modification in some circumstances.  EPA had long asserted the power over BACT
determinations it claimed here, had raised its concerns with the state agency beforehand, and had
suggested ways the state agency could justify its determination.  In addition, the state agency’s
final BACT determination does seem unreasonable and to be motivated by reluctance to impose
costs on a major employer in northwest Alaska rather than environmental concerns; notably, the
state agency never explained the inconsistency between its ultimate BACT determination and its
initial assessment that greater emissions control was economically feasible.  Id. at 478–80,
498–500.
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acted unreasonably in finding the facility met the CAA’s BACT requirements and
issuing a permit.19  
From the majority’s perspective, ADEC was simply an ordinary
administrative challenge, one in which federalism figured hardly at all and instead
the expertise and enforcement needs of the federal agency charged with
implementation dominated.  By contrast, the dissent written by Justice Kennedy
viewed the case fundamentally in federalism terms.   It argued vociferously that
the Court’s decision served remit “the federal balance . . . to a single agency
official”20  and “relegat[ed] States to the role of mere provinces or political
corporations, instead of coequal sovereigns entitled to the same dignity and
respect.”21  The majority responded that the federal courts were available to
protect the states against EPA overreaching, suggesting that it was not rejecting
potential federalism concerns wholesale but instead simply did not find such
concerns implicated in the specific agency action before it.22  For the most part,
however, the majority and dissent in ADEC  talked past one another, rather than
attempting to resolve the tension between their federalism and administrative law
rubrics.
As a result, ADEC offers little guidance about how the Court believes
federalism and administrative law principles should be integrated.  Yet it is an
early signal of the Court’s awareness of the potential connections between these
two areas of doctrine.
2. Gonzales v. Oregon.   In Oregon, the relationship between federalism
and administrative law, hinted at in ADEC, assumed center stage.  Decided in
2006, Oregon involved a challenge to Attorney General John Ashcroft’s
implementation of the Controlled Substances Act (CSA).   Under the CSA,
physicians can only dispense controlled substances if they are registered to do so
with the Attorney General.  In 2001, Attorney General John Ashcroft issued an
interpretive rule stating that prescribing controlled substances to assist suicide
23 546 U.S. 243, 254 (2006)
24 Id. at 255
25 533 U.S. 218 (2001).  The Oregon majority also cited precedent that precludes
application of Chevron deference in contexts where more than one agency is given sole
interpretive authority under a statute, and the CSA grants the Secretary of Health and Human
Services a central role when medical judgments are involved. 546 U.S. at 266; Jacob E. Gersen,
Overlapping and Underlapping Jurisdiction in Administrative Law, 2006 Sup. Ct. Rev. 201, 237
(emphasizing the importance of Congress’s decision toe delegate to multiple agents in the CSA). 
Interestingly, Court did not rely on Mead’s suggestion that Chevron deference generally should
apply only to agency statutory interpretations promulgated through agency procedures such as
notice and comment rulemaking, id. at 226-27, perhaps because that aspect of Mead has proven
more contentious for some members of the Court. See, e.g., Barnhardt v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212,
221 (2002).
26 546 U.S. at 272-73 (“The primary problem with the Government’s argument . . . is its
assumption that the CSA implicitly authorizes an Executive officer to bar a use simply because it
may be inconsistent with one reasonable understanding of medical practice.”); see also id. 253,
269 (emphasizing the Attorney General’s lack of any medical expertise and failure to consult
before issuing the interpretive rule—either with Oregon or others in the executive branch—as well
as noting Ashcroft’s prior efforts to prevent Oregon’s experiment with assisted suicide when a
member of the Senate.) 
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was grounds for suspending or revoking a doctor’s registration under the CSA
because assisting suicide was not a legitimate medical purpose.  As a practical
matter, this rule would have nullified Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act, which
legalized prescribing drugs in order to allow terminally ill patients to commit
suicide, as doctors would be unwilling to issue such prescriptions if by doing so
they risked losing their right to prescribe controlled substances altogether. 
Indeed, preventing assisted suicide under the Oregon act was clearly the
motivation behind the rule’s promulgation.23
In Oregon, the Court held that Ashcroft’s interpretive rule violated the
CSA and was thus invalid.  The majority portrayed its resolution of Oregon’s
challenge as an ordinary assessment of whether an executive official exceeded her
statutory authority; “an inquiry familiar to the courts” that was guided by
“familiar principles” of administrative law.24  In particular, the majority relied
upon the Court’s 2001 decision in United States v. Mead Corporation, which had
limited Chevron deference to instances when Congress had delegated authority to
issue rules with the force of law to the agency.25  The majority held that Congress
had not delegated authority to determine what constitutes legitimate medical
practice to the Attorney General, and thus that the interpretive rule did not merit
deference. More generally, the majority’s opinion was animated by concerns of
executive branch overreaching and self-aggrandizement.  The danger it invoked
was of a single executive official, lacking professional expertise and motivated by
ideology, imposing his personal views of legitimate medical practice on the
nation.26  Oregon thus stands as a prime example of administrative law’s
27 See Freeman & Vermeule, supra note , at 30-31;.  Professor Lisa Bressman has offered
a slightly different take on Gonzales, arguing that it was the profoundly undemocratic aspect of the
interpretive rule that made the Court reluctant to defer.  See Bressman, Democracy, supra note, at
765, 776–80; William N. Eskridge & Kevin S. Schwartz, Chevron and Agency Norm-
Entrepreneurship, 115 Yale L. J. 2623, 2630 (2006).  On the relationship between law and politics
in agency decisionmaking, see Peter L. Strauss, When the Judge Is Not the Primary Official with
Responsibility to Read: Agency Interpretation and the Problem of Legislative History, 66 Chi.-
Kent L. Rev. 321, 322, 335 (1990).
28  546 U.S. at 275. The similarity between this language and that of the ADEC dissent is
more than just coincidence, as Justice Kennedy was the author of both. 
29 Id. at 271 (quoting Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc. 471
U.S. 707, 710 (1985)).
30 Id. at 273
31 Id. at 269-72.  For a similar invocation of federalism to justify a narrower reading of a
federal statute than that offered by the federal agency charged with its implementation, see
Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2223-4. 
32 This linkage was in the case in its presentation to the Court, and the Ninth Circuit had
heavily stressed federalism in invalidating the interpretive rule.  See Oregon v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d
1118, 1124 (9th Cir. 2004).
33 546 U.S. at 270; see also Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
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longstanding concerns with politics trumping law and unchecked executive
authority.27  
Yet the decision also plainly turns on federalism concerns.   It was not
simply concentrated power in the Attorney General that troubled the majority, but
more specifically that “a single Executive officer [would have] the power to effect
a radical shift of authority from the States to the Federal Government to define
general standards of medical practice in every locality.”28  Such was at odds with
usual practice, under which “regulation of health and safety is ‘primarily, and
historically, a matter of local concern.’”29  Reading the CSA against this
federalism backdrop, the majority rejected the idea that through the statute
Congress intended to assert “expansive federal authority to regulate medicine.”30 
Instead, it portrayed the CSA as having a far more limited aim, preventing drug
abuse and drug trafficking, and as relying on state regulation of medical
practice.31 
Oregon therefore represents an instance in which the Court clearly linked
federalism and administrative law.32  On the surface the majority’s integration of
these two appears smooth; according to the majority, the federalism implications
of the interpretive rule were reason to doubt the Attorney General’s claim of
delegated authority and to refuse to defer to his view of the CSA.33  But tensions
exist underneath this superficial doctrinal consistency.  A core question left open
by the majority opinion is whether its result would have been different had the
34  The decision’s narrow view of the CSA appears to preclude the latter possibility, as
does its emphasis on Congress’s role in maintaining the federal-state balance and the statute’s
express restriction on preemption.   546 U.S. at 251, 269-74.   But that conclusion is somewhat at
odds with the opinion’s repeated emphasis on “the Secretary’s primacy in shaping medical policy
under the CSA” and its assertion that “no question” exists that the federal government has
constitutional authority to regulate medical practice.  Id at 271, 274; see also Gersen, supra note _. 
Moreover, given the majority’s recognition that “legitimate medical purpose” is ambiguous, it is
unclear why such a joint, administratively proper determination by the federal officials delegated
authority in this area by Congress should not be given deference.  546 U.S. at 258.
35 The EPA’s actions in ADEC lacked many of the indicia of abuse and federal agency
overreaching that characterized the Attorney General’s interpretive rule in Oregon.  See supra note
_.
36 Federalism concerns surfaced in only one amicus brief submitted by Arizona and other
states on behalf of Massachusetts.  See Br. of the States of Arizona et al., Amici Curiae in Support
of Petitioners, at 22-23, 2006 WL 2563380; Dru Stevenson, Special Solicitude for State Standing:
Massachusetts v. EPA, 112 Penn. State L. Rev. 1 5, n.18, 30-31 (2007).  Nor was the case an
obvious vehicle for raising federalism concerns, given that it arose from a rulemaking petition filed
with the EPA by private environmental groups; Massachusetts and other governments intervened
in the case only after the rulemaking petition was denied.   127 S. Ct 1438, 1449–51.
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Attorney General’s rejection of assisted suicide emerged from a more
consultative, formal process in which views of the Secretary of HHS were
solicited and given determinative weight.  Put differently, was the real problem
here a violation of federalism norms or deviation from appropriate administrative
process?34  Answering this question was not necessary to resolve the case, but
leaving it open obscures the import of Oregon regarding how federalism and
administrative law intersect.  In addition, the contrast between the decisions in
Oregon and ADEC is noteworthy; in Oregon, the Court invoked federalism as a
reason not to defer to a federal agency’s assertion of authority, whereas in ADEC
the Court did defer notwithstanding the troubling federalism implications of doing
so.  Although largely fueled by factual differences between the two cases,35 this
unexplained discrepancy in results reinforces the sense that the Court lacked a
consistent understanding of the relationship between federalism and
administrative law.
3. Massachusetts v. EPA.  Federalism and administrative law were again
expressly linked in Massachusetts, a 5-4 decision issued a year later in 2007 in
which the Court held that the state of Massachusetts had standing to challenge
EPA’s refusal to regulate carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases as air
pollutants, and further that the reasons EPA gave to justify this refusal violated
the CAA.  In its presentation to the Court, Massachusetts appeared to be just an
administrative law challenge—indeed, federalism was almost entirely absent from
the case as it was briefed to the Court and in the decision below.36  The majority
opinion in Massachusetts imbued the case with federalism implications, however,
by emphasizing Massachusetts’s status as a sovereign state in holding that
Massachusetts had standing to sue.  According to the majority, “[i]t is of
37 127 S. Ct. at 1454.
38 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1454–55.
39 The majority sought to draw an analogy to parens patriae precedent involving
interstate pollution, in which the Court had emphasized the state’s “quasi-sovereign” interests “in
all the earth and air within its domain” and in having “the last word as to whether its mountains
shall be stripped of forests and its inhabitants shall breathe pure air.” 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1454
(quoting Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907)).  Insofar as the majority
was using these cases to establish that Massachusetts had a cognizable interest in “preserv[ing] its
sovereign territory” which was being lost due to rising water levels, the invocation of
Massachusetts’s state status seems unnecessary, given that Massachusetts actually owned a “great
deal” of coastal property in the state.  127 S. Ct. 1438, 1454; see also infra Part II.B.1.  If, on the
other hand, the majority sought to draw a connection to Massachusetts’s regulatory interest in
controlling pollutant emissions within its borders, then—as Chief Justice Roberts argued in
dissent—the federal-state context of the dispute before the Court rendered this interstate precedent
inapplicable.  By joining the union states did not cede regulatory authority over their territory to
each other, but they did grant such power to the federal government.  Not surprisingly, therefore,
existing precedent is far less sympathetic to a state’s assertion of quasi-sovereign interests on
behalf of its citizens against the federal government.  Mass v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923); 
Alfred L. Snapp & Son v. Puerto Rico ex rel Barez, 458 U.S. 592 (1982). 
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considerable relevance that the party seeking review here is a Sovereign state”37:
When a State enters the Union, it surrenders certain
sovereign prerogatives.  Massachusetts cannot invade Rhode
Island to force reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, it cannot
negotiate an emissions treaty with China or India, and in some
circumstances the exercise of its police powers to reduce in-state
motor-vehicle emissions might well be preempted.
These sovereign prerogatives are now lodged in the Federal
Government, and Congress has ordered EPA to protect
Massachusetts (among others) by prescribing [air pollutant]
standards. . . . Congress has moreover recognized a concomitant
procedural right to challenge the rejection of its rulemaking
petition as arbitrary and capricious.  Given that procedural right
and Massachusetts’ stake in protecting its quasi-sovereign
interests, the Commonwealth is entitled to special solicitude in our
standing analysis.38
Despite taking the initiative to invoke federalism concerns, the majority
was quite imprecise with respect to how Massachusetts’s sovereignty interests
were implicated.39  Massachusetts was not claiming that its own regulatory efforts
were unduly preempted by EPA or that the federal government was exceeding its
constitutional powers—on the contrary, Massachusetts’ central allegation was
that the federal government was not asserting its authority enough.  The majority
never explained why, having ceded regulatory authority to the federal government
40 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a).  Section 209(b) provides that EPA must grant a waiver for
emissions controls promulgated by California  (the only state with such a program in 1965),
provided California determines that its “standards will be, in the aggregate, at least as protective of
public health and welfare” as the federal standards and EPA does not find that this state
determination is arbitrary and capricious, that California does not need the standards to meet
“compelling and extraordinary conditions,” or that California’s standards are inconsistent with
Section 202(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7521.  The CAA further provides that other states may adopt and
enforce California’s standards.  Id. § 7521(a).  California issued such emission standards, which
were then adopted by eleven other states.  See J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Timing and Form of
Federal Regulation: The Case of Climate Change, 155 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1499, 1527.  EPA denied
California’s request for a waiver in December 2007, two years after the request was filed.   Letter
from Stephen Johnson, EPA Administrator, to Arnold Schwarzenegger, Governor of California
(Dec. 19, 2007) available at http://www.epa.gov/otaq/climate/20071219-slj.pdf.
41 See Bradford C. Mank, Should States Have Greater Standing Rights than Ordinary
Citizens, 49 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. __, __(forthcoming 2008); Kathryn A. Watts & Amy J.
Wildermuth, Massachusetts v. EPA: Breaking New Ground on Issues Other than Global Warming,
102 NW. U. L. Rev. __, __ (forthcoming 2008); 102 NW. U. L. Rev. Colloquy 1, 6-7 (2007).  In
addition, the CAA embodies a cooperative regulatory framework, under which states bear
responsibility in the first instance for devising plans to ensure that air pollutant emissions within
their borders meet federal air quality standards. [STAT CITE]  The special role the states play in
implementing the CAA could also be thought to give them added ability to challenge
determinations EPA makes under the Act. 
42 Although the majority insisted that Massachusetts was simply asserting “its rights under
the [CAA],”  127 S. Ct. 1438, 1454–55 & n.17, the rights it was referring to were simply
Massachusetts’ rights to petition EPA to engage in a rulemaking regarding new motor vehicle
emissions of greenhouse gases and to challenge EPA’s violation of statutory requirements.  The
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over an area, a state would continue to have a sovereignty interest in forcing the
federal government to exercise that authority in a particular manner.
One possible explanation would focus on preemption.  Section 209(a) of
the CAA the CAA prohibits any state or political subdivision from adopting or
enforcing “any standard relating to the control of emissions from new motor
vehicles or new motor vehicle engines.”40  This prohibition arguably give states
distinct sovereign interests in ensuring that the EPA fulfills its statutory duties
under the CAA.  On this view, having been disabled by Congress from asserting
its own regulatory authority, a state has a sovereign interest in ensuring that the
federal government fulfills its regulatory responsibilities and regulatory gaps are
avoided.41  Such an argument for state standing is certainly open to a variety of
objections—among others, that allowing states access to federal court based
solely on sovereignty interests fails to accord with the Constitution’s limitation of
the federal judicial power to “cases” and “controversies” and thus to legal as
opposed to political disputes.  But it at least offers an explanation of why state
sovereignty interests might be seen as implicated by the administrative challenge
before the Court.
This alternative account is not, however, one offered by the Massachusetts
majority.42   Instead, although clearly indicating that the Court perceived a
problem is that these rights were in no way unique to Massachusetts as a state.  See 42 U.S.C.  §
7607(b)(1) (providing that a petition seeking review of the Administrator’s action in promulgating
a standard under § 7521 or any final action taken by the Administrator must be filed in the D.C.
Circuit, but not limiting who can file such a petition); see also id. § 7604, (“any person” may bring
a suit against the Administrator to challenge the Administrator’s failure to undertake a
nondiscretionary duty). 
43 See Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From Politics to
Expertise, Supreme Court Review (forthcoming 2007) draft at 12-14.
44 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
45 127 S. Ct. 1559 (2007).   In addition, in a few cases involving challenges to state
actions in the context of cooperative federal-state programs, the Court emphasized the importance
of the views of the federal agency involved.  See, e.g., Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh,
538 U.S. 644, 667-68 (2003); S. D. Warren Co. v. Me. Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 126 S. Ct. 1843, 1849
(2006); Wash. State Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs. v. Keffeler, 537 U.S. 371, 391 (2003).  
Interestingly, however—and consistent with developments in administrative law generally—the
Court generally gave little weight to federal views when those views were simply presented in
amicus briefs in court, as opposed to officially adopted by the agency in the course of its
implementation of the relevant statute.  See, e.g., Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, 544 U.S. 431 (2005)
(rejecting federal argument in favor of preemption raised solely by amicus briefs and not involving
any concurring) (emphasizing importance of agency expertise on preemption questions); Arkansas
Dept of Health & Human Servs. v. Alhborn, 547 U.S. 268 (2006) (rejecting US arguments in favor
of state action raised primarily in amicus brief and noting that agency adjudicatory decisions cited
by state were distinguishable on their facts, although also commenting that these decisions were at
odds with statutory text); see also Engine Mfrs Engine Mfrs. Ass'n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt.
Dist., 541 U.S. 246 (2004)(making no reference to US’s views in favor of preemption presented
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connection between federalism and this challenge to federal agency action, the
opinion—like the opinions in ADEC, Raich, and Oregon—leaves the nature of
this connection quite opaque.   Perhaps the majority’s emphasis on state status is a
signal of the Court developing a deeper understanding of the role that states can
play in overseeing federal program administration.  Or perhaps this emphasis was
simply a way of garnering Justice Kennedy’s vote and is a rule good for one case
only, with the ultimate significance of Massachusetts being simply its forgiving
application of the standard Lujan standing analysis to force the government to
address global warming.43  A third, equally plausible view is that Massachusetts
will serve to undermine private groups’ access to the courts to challenge
regulatory inaction, with the looser demands of injury, causation, and
redressibility being read as only appropriate when states are plaintiffs. 
B. Administrative Law’s Appearance in Federalism Challenges
Just as federalism has surfaced in administrative law challenges, so too
has administrative law appeared in the Court’s federalism decisions, albeit to date
playing a more tangential role.  Here two decisions are particularly worthy of
note:  Gonzales v. Raich44 and Watters v. Wachovia Bank.45
only in amicus briefs, notwithstanding Court agreed that California’s fleet rules preempted). 
46 Cal. Health & Safety Code Ann. §§ 11362.5(d).
47 Raich, 545 U.S. at 17.
48 Raich, 545 U.S. at 25–26.
49 Raich, 545 U.S. 22. 
50 545 U.S. at 48-57.
51 545 U.S. 1, 14-15 & n.23, 28 n.25, 33 (2005).
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1.  Gonzales v. Raich.  Decided a year before Oregon, Raich also involved
the CSA, but its focus was on whether the CSA fell within Congress’s commerce
power.  In 1996 California passed a medical marijuana initiative, legalizing
personal medical use and possession of marijuana.46  The California law
conflicted with the CSA, which lists marijuana as a Schedule I drug, and therefore
prohibits all use of it.  Two women who used marijuana under the terms of the
California measure brought suit, arguing that the CSA’s ban exceeded Congress’s
commerce power as applied to the cultivation, possession, and use of marijuana
for personal medical purposes.  By a 6-3 vote the Court rejected this claim.  The
Raich majority was unsympathetic to the plaintiffs’ as-applied framing,
emphasizing that Congress has “power to regulate purely local activities that are
part of an economic ‘class of activities’ that have a substantial effect on interstate
commerce.”47  Describing the activities regulated by the CSA as “quintessentially
economic,”48 the majority held that “Congress had a rational basis for believing
that failure to regulate intrastate manufacture and possession of marijuana would
leave a gaping hole in the CSA” and undermine that statute’s comprehensive
regulatory scheme.49  By contrast, the dissent insisted that the relevant activity
was the cultivation, possession, and use of marijuana for personal medical
purposes, which it deemed noneconomic and outside the scope of the commerce
power.50
Raich is overwhelming a federalism decision, and its focus is clearly on
the scope of Congress’s constitutional powers.  But administrative law also
surfaces here, with the Court repeatedly noting that under the CSA the Attorney
General has authority to change a drug’s schedule classification.51  Moreover,
despite protesting that the specifics of how marijuana is regulated has “no
relevance” to the question of congressional power, the majority went so far as to
suggest that administrative denial of a petition to reschedule marijuana might well
be overturned on appeal: “We acknowledge that evidence proffered by
respondents in this case regarding the effective medical uses for marijuana, if
52 Id. at 28 n.25.  This statement is particularly odd because the majority was reaching out
to address a claim not before the Court.  Compare id. at 33 (refusing to reach the respondents
substantive due process and medical necessity defense claims on this ground).  In addition, the
statement appears to mischaracterize the procedure used to review a scheduling classification
insofar as it suggests the proper schedule listing for marijuana would ever be a matter for a “trial.” 
Under the CSA, the means for challenging the level at which marijuana is listed is an
administrative petition directed to the Attorney General which would trigger a formal rulemaking
procedure and then be subject to judicial review based on the rulemaking record.   See 21 U.S.C.
§ 811; see also Nova Scotia United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240 (2nd
Cir. 1977) (holding that review of a regulation is based solely on the rulemaking record, not
supplemented by additional evidence introduced at a subsequent enforcement trial). But the
majority may simply have used the term “trial” loosely to mean challenge.
53Or political constraints.  See Raich, 545 U.S. at 33 (“[P]erhaps even more important
than these legal avenues is the democratic process, in which the voices of voters allied with these
respondents may one day be heard in the halls of Congress.”).
54 See 12 U.S.C. §§ 24, 93a, 371(a), NationsBank v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513
U.S. 251, 254 (1995).  A core aspect of supervision, the ability to inspect a bank’s books and
operations, is referred to as “visitorial powers” and the NBA provides that “[n]o national bank
shall be subject to any visitorial powers except as authorized by Federal law.” Id. § 484(a).
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found credible after trial, would cast serious doubt on the accuracy of the findings
that require marijuana to be listed in Schedule I.”52 
Although administrative law plays only a marginal role in the majority
opinion and is largely relegated to the footnotes, the interesting question is why it
appears at all.  The most plausible explanation is that it offers some solace to the
specter of unlimited federal power.  The majority wanted to underscore that
finding an activity to fall within the scope of Congress’s constitutional authority
did not mean that the resulting federal regulation was free of all legal constraints
against federal overreaching.53  The rescheduling option may have been
“irrelevant” to the constitutional question of the scope of congressional authority,
but it was quite relevant on a subconstitutional federalism level, as a means states
could exploit to preserve the ability to experiment with medical care and obtained
judicial scrutiny of federal determinations.  Like ADEC, however, the Raich
majority failed to spell out the relationship it saw between federalism and
administrative law, thereby limiting its impact on future cases.
2.  Watters v. Wachovia Bank.  The Watters decision, the last in the
quintet, was issued just two weeks after Massachusetts.  Watters involved the
interplay between federal and state banking authorities, and in particular the
extent of supervision the latter could assert over state-chartered subsidiaries of
national banks.  Under the National Bank Act (NBA), national or federally-
chartered banks are subject to oversight by the federal Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency (OCC), with states generally being denied supervisory authority,
also known as “visitorial powers.”54  Ordinarily, state-chartered banking
institutions are subject to state oversight, which in the case of Michigan’s law
meant that institutions had to obtain a state license, file reports with the state, and
55 127 S.Ct. 1559, 1565–66.
5612 CFR § 7.4006. 
57 See id.; see also 12 U.S.C. § 24a(g)(3)(A); 12 CFR § 5.34(e) (2006).  OCC also argued
in favor of broad preemption of substantive state law as applied to national banks.  See infra note
__ . 
58 For earlier decisions presenting but not resolving this question, see Geier v. Am. Honda
Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 883–86 (2000) (stating that DOT’s position that federal regulatory
standard preempted state tort action at issue should be accorded “some weight,” but holding
deference unnecessary to conclude preemption appropriate); id. at 911 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(arguing deference to agency views raised in legal brief inappropriate); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr,
518 U.S. 470, 496 (1996) (stating that its determination that statute did not preempt state tort
claims was “substantially informed” by federal regulations and that the agency’s views of the
statute should be given ‘considerable weight”); id. at 505 (Breyer, J., concurring) (arguing that
agencies should have “a degree of leeway” to determine preemptive effect of ambiguous statutes);
id. at 512 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“It is not certain that an agency regulation determining the
pre-emptive effect of any federal statute is entitled toe deference.”); Smiley v. Citibank (South
Dakota) N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 744 (1996) (assuming arguendo that the question of whether a statute
is preemptive “must always be decided de novo by the courts”).
59 See Medtronic Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (describing the presumption
against preemption set out in Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). 
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were subject to state audits.55  In 2000, the OCC promulgated a regulation
providing that “State laws apply to national bank operating subsidiaries to the
same extent that those laws apply to the parent national bank.”56  Given that state
supervisory laws do not apply to national banks under the NBA absent express
statutory provision to the contrary, the import of the regulation was to preempt
state supervision in regard to all national bank operating subsidiaries, even those
that are state-chartered.57 
Watters appeared to be the occasion on which the Court would resolve a
recurrent question in preemption challenges that directly engages the relationship
between federalism and administrative law:  to what extent should courts defer to
administrative agencies’ interpretations of the preemptive scope of the statutes
they administer?58   On the one hand, the presumption against preemption and
federalism concerns with intruding on a traditional area of state regulation
counseled against granting deference to the OCC’s regulation.59  On the other,
from a purely administrative law perspective, the OCC’s views deserved
deference:  the NBA did not expressly address the question of state supervision of
national bank subsidiaries; the OCC was the federal agency charged with
implementing the NBA; and the OCC had promulgated its regulation using
60 See, e.g., Coke v. Long Island Care at Home v. Coke, 127 S. Ct. 2339, __ (2007);
United States v. Mead Corp, 533 U.S. 218, __ (2001).  All of the appellate courts that considered
challenges to state efforts to exercise oversight over national bank subsidiaries had invoked
Chevron in upholding the OCC’s regulation.  See  National City Bank of Indiana v. Turnbaugh,
463 F.3d 325, 331-33 (4th Cir. 2006); Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Burke, 414 F.3d 305, 315-16 (2nd
Cir. 2005); Watters v. Wachovia Bank; 431 F.3d 556, 560-63 (6th Cir. 2005); Wells Fargo Bank,
N.A. v. Boutris, 419 F.3d 949, 962-67 (9th Cir. 2005). 
61 127 S. Ct. 1559, 1572-73 & n.13.  Justice Thomas did not participate.  Justice Stevens
disagreed with the majority’s view of the NBA and also argued that Chevron deference was
inappropriate here.  See id. at 1578-79, 1581-85.  
62 127 S. Ct. at 1568, 1572-73.
63 See, e.g., 127 S. Ct. at 1567 (“We have ‘interpreted grants of . . . powers to national
banks as grants of authority . . .  Ordinarily pre-empting contrary state law.’” (quoting Barnett
Bank); id. at 1571 (“Security against significant interference by state regulators is a characteristic
condition of the business of banking conducted by national banks . . .”)(internal quotations
omitted).  Their different understandings of the NBA and banking in general may explain the
interesting line-up of Justices in the case; Justice Ginsburg, often solicitous of state regulatory
authority, wrote the majority opinion, in which she was joined by Justice Kennedy, a frequent
advocate of state interests.  On the other hand, Justice Scalia, usually insistent on full-scale
application of Chevron—including in Gonzales v. Oregon, application of Chevron to agency
action that preempted state regulation—joined Justice Stevens’ dissent that seemed to suggest
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notice-and-comment rulemaking.  Ordinarily, these features would suffice to
trigger Chevron deference.60  
The Supreme Court, however, held in a 5-3 decision that the NBA itself
preempted state supervision over national bank subsidiaries, concluding that
therefore the degree of deference due the OCC here was “an academic question”
it need not address.61  But that the majority foreswore the need to discuss Chevron
deference should not be read as signally that the decision bypassed administrative
law.  On the contrary, its analysis fell well within the administrative law ambit:
like Massachusetts, in administrative law terms the Watters decision represents a
Chevron step one determination, to the effect that the NBA unambiguously
preempted the state supervisory and licensing requirements at issue.
Watters represents an expansive approach to preemption.  Strikingly, the
majority treated the possibility of both state and federal oversight of state-
chartered subsidiaries as an unjustified regulatory burden, rather than as a
common feature of a federal system—and one national banks could have avoided
by not utilizing state-chartered subsidiaries.62  Indeed, the majority denied that a
subsidiary’s state-chartered status gave states any more legitimate interest in
overseeing its actions than they would have in the overseeing its parent national
bank.  To a large extent, the majority’s unsympathetic stance to the states
stemmed from the fact that the case involved the NBA, a statute the Court has
fairly consistently read as creating a presumption against state regulation of
national banks and in favor of exclusive federal control.63  Yet application of the
Chevron was never applicable to preemptive agency action absent express statutory authorization.
64 See infra TAN __-__ (Part II.C.2) (discussing ambiguity in the NBA); see also Kenneth
E. Scott, The Dual Banking System, 30 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 3-6 (1977) (describing the dual banking
system and noting the importance played by chartering entity).  It also merits noting that national
banks that want to avoid the burdens of state oversight appear to have alternatives:  conducting the
activities in question through a separate division of the national bank rather than through an
operating subsidiary, see 127 S. Ct. 1559, 1585 (Stevens, J., dissenting), or seeking a federal
charter for their operating subsidiaries. [CHECK LATTER]. 
65 Although the OCC has adopted regulations broadly preempting state banking laws as
applied to national banks, that issue was not before the Court in Watters.  Moreover, the decision
was generally careful to limit its holding to state enforcement and not state power to regulate. 
Compare 127 S Ct 1559, 1564–65, 1573 (describing holding as being that national bank operating
subsidiaries are not subject to “licensing, reporting, and visitorial regimes of the several States”);
see also id. at 1567 (noting that national banks are subject to state laws of general applicability “to
the extent such laws do not conflict with the letter or the general purposes of the NBA”) with 127
S. Ct. 1559, 1570 (referring to burdens imposed by “duplicative state examination, supervision,
and regulation)(emphasis added): id. at 1568 n. 6 (quoting OCC regn, 69 FR 1908 (2004)
(discussing burdens “of multiple, often unpredictable, different state or local restrictions and
requirements”).
66 See Brief for the Petitioner at 31-39, Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 127 S.Ct. 1559
(2007) (No. 05-1342), 2006 WL 2570336; Brief of the States of New York, et al. as Amicus
Curiae in Support of the Petitioner at 8, Watters, 127 S.Ct. 1559 (No. 05-1342), 2006 WL
2570992.  See Wilmarth, supra note , at 275,–76, 292, 296–97 (arguing that OCC is too self-
interested on the question of preemption because of its reliance on fees from banks with national
charters and describing OCC’s advocacy of freedom from state laws as an advantage of a national
charter).  Conflicts between OCC and the states were not limited to the state-chartered subsidiary
context, but instead had also arisen in regard to enforcement of state consumer protection laws
generally.  See Clearing House Ass’n, L.L.C. v. Cuomo, 510 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 2007); Nicholas
Bagley, Note, The Unwarranted Regulatory Preemption of Predatory Lending Laws, 79 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 2274, 2284-86 (2004) (OCC preemption of state predatory lending laws).  Adding substance
to the states fears are the OCC’s own statements indicating that it believes most substantive state
laws are preempted as applied to national banks.   See  OCC, Bank Activities and Operations, 69
Fed. Reg. 1895,1912-13 (2004); Arthur E. Wilmarth, The OCC’s Preemption Rules Exceed the
Agency’s Authority and Present a Serious Threat to the Dual Banking System and Consumer
Protection, 23 Ann. Rev. Banking & Fin. L. 225, 233 (2004).
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NBA presumption here was certainly contestable, given the importance of state
versus federal chartered status to the nation’s dual banking system, as well as the
lack of clear authorization in the NBA for either national banks’ use of state-
chartered operating subsidiaries or the displacement of state supervision of such
subsidiaries.64  Perhaps more importantly, the majority never addressed the states’
concern that, absent some independent oversight role, they would lack the ability
to enforce state laws to which the subsidiaries at issue were subject.65  Although
such state laws were enforceable by the OCC, Michigan and its amici expressed
concern that the OCC was aggressively seeking to free national banks from state
control and would prove unwilling to enforce state consumer protection laws in
the place of state agencies.66  
67 The Court likely will be forced to confront the administrative preemption issue head on
in Wyeth v. Levine, a case on its calendar for next Term addressing the extent to which approval of
a prescription drug label by the Federal Drug Administration preempts state tort law actions based
on that labeling. The FDA has taken the position, in a preamble to a recent rule on drug labeling,
that its labeling determinations are preemptive.  Department of Health & Human Servs., FDA,
Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and Biological
Prods., 71 Fed. Reg. 3922 (2006).  In Wyeth, the Vermont Supreme Court did not defer to the
FDA’s view and found a state law failure to warn claim not preempted.  2006 Vt. 107, ¶¶ 30-32.  
Administrative preemption may also arise in conjunction with Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., a
case on which the Court recently heard oral argument.  In Riegel, the Second Circuit held state law
claims for injuries caused by medical devices that received premarket approval from the FDA
under the1976 Medical Device Amendments (MDA) to the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act
(FDCA) are preempted. 451 F.3d. 104, 106 (2006).  Although FDA regulations limit preemption to
instances in which the FDA has established “specific counterpart regulations or . . . other specific
requirements applicable to a particular device,” 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d) (1995), in amicus briefs in
recent years the FDA  has taken the view that premarket approval does broadly preempt state
claims.  Thus, how much deference is due to the agency’s view of the statute’s preemptive effect
could be centrally implicated in the case, and the Solicitor General had urged the Court not to
grant cert in Wyeth before issuing its decision in Riegel for this reason.  However, the fact that the
Court granted certiorari in Wyeth appears a strong indication that its decision in Riegel will not
address this question.  A third case on the Court’s docket for this Term, Warner-Lambert v. Kent,
128 S. Ct. 31 (2007), also addresses the preemptive effect of FDA actions, specifically whether
state tort claims are preempted where plaintiffs allege that the drug company withheld or
misrepresented information that would have changed the agency's approval decision—so called
“fraud on the FDA” cases.
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Thus, despite being decided in close succession, Watters and
Massachusetts are polar opposites in their approach to state interests.  In
Massachusetts, the Court injected federalism into what had previously been
thought a purely administrative law case and underscored the legitimacy of
undefined state sovereignty interests.  By contrast, in Watters it declared
federalism essentially irrelevant and gave little weight to a concern seemingly
central to state sovereignty: ensuring adequate enforcement of state laws. 
Interestingly, Massachusetts could be seen to offer a remedy for the enforcement
gap that the states feared in Watters, because Massachusetts’ logic would suggest
that states should have standing to sue the OCC to enforce state laws if the OCC
refuses to do so and the states cannot enforce these laws themselves.  Yet
notwithstanding the states’ expressed concerns and the immediacy of the
Massachusetts precedent, the Watters majority opinion nowhere discusses the
relationship between federal and state regulatory agencies, directing its attention
instead solely to the relationship between federal and state legislation.
The striking contrast between Massachusetts and Watters suggests
confusion on the Court with respect to how to structure the relationship between
federalism and administrative law.  More clarification seems likely to come when
the Court decides several cases currently on its docket that address federal agency
preemption of state law.67  
II.  ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AS A FEDERALISM SURROGATE
20
Five decisions are too few in number to do more than hint at possible
trends in the Court’s understanding of how federalism and administrative law
intersect.  This is particularly true of decisions such as Massachusetts and
Oregon, given their highly politicized content and the evident perception by the
majority in each of egregious agency overreaching.  Watters and ADEC, by
contrast, demonstrate the justices’ willingness to uphold what they view as more
reasonable agency positions, while Raich’s invocations of administrative
rescheduling are largely window dressing on a strong affirmation of national
power.   From one perspective then, these are highly factbound decisions with
limited general import.  Moreover, a striking feature of all five decisions is the
largely undeveloped nature of the Court’s analysis.  In none did the Court offer an
account of the relationship between federalism and administrative law that went
beyond the case at hand.  Indeed, as the comparisons above suggest, the decisions
at times appear almost inconsistent in approach, particularly in the degree to
which the Court gave weight to state sovereignty concerns.  Hence, it seems fair
to say that the Court has yet to arrive at a coherent understanding of what the
relationship between federalism and administrative law should be.  
Nonetheless, these decisions share some common if inchoate themes.  One
is their unwillingness to curb congressional regulatory authority, whether by
means of straightforward constitutional federalism restrictions or
subconstitutional doctrines requiring clear authorization for federal agency action
that substantially impacts the states.  Another is their recurrent reliance on
administrative law as a surrogate mechanism for addressing federalism concerns. 
The character of this surrogacy role varies and the extent to which the Court is
intentionally using administrative law in this way is unclear.  But at least as a
practical matter, in these decisions administrative law operates to mitigate the
impact of federal agency decisions on the states and protect the states against
federal agency overreaching.  This use of administrative law as a federalism
surrogate is obscured in the current debate over administrative preemption, which
tends to underscore tensions between federalism and administrative law rather
than their potential symbiosis.
A. Administrative Law as the New Federalism
1.  The Absence of Constitutional Federalism Curbs on Congress.  An
important initial point to note is the Court’s unwillingness to curb congressional
regulatory authority on constitutional federalism grounds.  This unwillingness is
most apparent in Raich, with its deference to Congress on the question of what
constitutes the relevant class of activities against which a Commerce Clause
challenge is assessed, its broad definition of economic activity, and its lack of
68 545 U.S. 1, 25; see also Ernest A. Young, Just Blowing Smoke?  Politics, Doctrine, and
the Federalist Revival After Gonzales v. Raich, 2005 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 33-37 (critiquing Raich’s
failure to take state experimentation seriously).
69 See 545 U.S. 1, 46 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that Raich’s deference to
congressional class of activity determinations transformed the decisions in United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549 (1995) and United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), which had upheld
commerce power challenges, into “nothing more than a drafting guide” that warned Congress
about the consequences of regulating too narrowly).  For a similar views of Raich, see Jonathan
Adler, Is Morrison Dead? Assessing a Supreme Drug (Law) Overdose, 9 Lewis & Clark Law
Review 751, 762-66 (2005); Ilya Somin, Gonzales v. Raich: Federalism as a Casualty of the War
on Drugs, 15 Cornell J. L. & Pub. Pol'y 507, 513-19  (2006); see also Young, Just Blowing
Smoke?  supra note , at 38-40 (arguing that “[o]ne can identify plausible federal statutes . . . that
would exceptionally hard to justify on any of the theories offered in Raich,” but adding that “Raich
most likely marks the outer bound of the Court’s ambition in Commerce Clause cases” and that
“[a] rollback of the national regulatory state was never in the cards.”).
70 Cf. Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2224 (2006) (finding that federal
jurisdiction over “ephemeral flows of water” under the CWA “stretches the outer limits of
Congress's commerce power” and would require a clearer statement from Congress); Solid Waste
Agency of N. Cook Cty. v. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159, 172-73 (2001) (limiting federal
jurisdiction under the CWA to navigable waters to avoid Commerce Clause issue).
71 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997); New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144, 188 (1992).
72  Nor will the Court’s recent changes in membership likely effect this conclusion, given
that Justices Kennedy and Scalia voted to uphold congressional power in Raich.
73  The Watters dissent is clearest on this, rejecting out-of-hand Michigan’s suggestion
that granting federal agencies the power of preemption violated the Tenth Amendment.  See 127 S.
Ct. 1559, 1585 (2007).  Justice Kennedy was more oblique in ADEC, in particular noting
constitutional limits on the commerce power such as the anti-commandeering rule, but ultimately
he too appears to accept Congress’s “vast legislative authority” would allow it to authorize federal
agency review of state agency and state court determinations.  540 U.S. 461, 512-13 (2004).  As
discussed above, three justices in Raich did assert that application of the CSA to personal medical
use and cultivation of marijuana was outside Congress’s power.  See supra TAN __.
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concern with protecting state regulatory experiments.68  Little will fall outside of
Congress’ regulatory purview under Raich’s approach to the commerce power.69 
No doubt, some measures may go too far in regulating intrastate activity,70 and
constraints such as the anti-commandeering rule will continue to apply.71 
Nonetheless, Raich’s clear import is that the expansive view of the commerce
power, in place since the New Deal, will largely continue to govern.72  
The other five decisions echo this same theme; in none did the Court
suggest that Congress had overstepped its constitutional authority by enacting the
regulatory scheme in question.  Indeed, even the Watters and ADEC dissents
agreed that Congress had power to authorize federal agencies to preempt state
action or review state administrative determinations.73  Further evidence of the
74 See Daniel J. Meltzer, The Supreme Court’s Judicial Passivity, 2002 Sup. Ct. Rev. 343,
362-68; see also Catherine M. Sharkey & Samuel Issacharoff, Backdoor Federalization, 53
U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1353, 1372 (2006); Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court’s Two Federalisms,
83 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 30-32, 130-34 (2004).  As many have noted, the Court’s preemption
jurisprudence, particularly relating to preemption of state tort law, is marked by inconsistencies.
See e.g. Viet Dinh, Reassessing the Law of Preemption, 88 Geo. L. J. 2085 (2000); Jack
Goldsmith, Statutory Foreign Affairs Preemption, 2000 Sup. Ct. Rev. 175 (2000); Roderick M.
Hills, Jr., Against Preemption: Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the National
Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 17-36 (2007); Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 Va. L. Rev.
225 (2000).  Thus although generally expansive in its preemption inquiry in recent years, the Court
has also occasionally invoked a presumption against preemption and read the preemptive effect of
federal statutes more narrowly.  See, e.g., Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005);
Young, Blowing Smoke, supra note , at 40-41.
75 Meltzer, supra note , at 369.
76 Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 605 (2004) (upholding federal bribery statute that
covers any employee of a entity that receives more than $10,000 in federal funds, including a state
or local government, under the spending power and Necessary and Proper Clause.); see also
United States v. American Library Assn, 539 U.S. 194, 203 (2003) (plurality op.) (discussing
federal government’s ability to broadly impose conditions on federal grants).  The Court has been
much more willing to impose limits on Congress’s Congress’s authority under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, but the commerce power is far more important to the modern federal
administrative state.  See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 n.9
(U.S. 2001) [noting that duties on public Ers still apply, all that is invalidated is private money
damages remedy]. 
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absence of constitutional federalism comes from the Court’s preemption
determination in Watters, with its willingness to find preemption absent clearly
stated congressional intent and based on a pragmatic assessment of the impact of
state involvement on the federal regulatory scheme.  In this regard, Watters was
typical of recent preemption jurisprudence, in which the Court has regularly
upheld preemption claims absent a clear and direct conflict between federal and
state law, based on its conclusion that nonetheless state law would be an obstacle
to achieving the underlying purposes of federal regulation.74  As Daniel Meltzer
has noted, such “[a] freewheeling preemption jurisprudence . . . limits state
autonomy.”75 
As that suggests, the lack of constitutional curbs on congressional
regulatory authority is hardly unique to these five decisions.  The Court has
signaled similar reluctance to limit other forms of congressional power that
underlie many federal regulatory programs, in particular the spending power and
the Necessary and Proper Clause.76  Equally important, in its 2001 decision in
Whitman v. American Trucking Associations the Court refused to curtail
Congress’s ability to delegate power broadly to administrative agencies, stating it
has “‘almost never felt qualified to second-guess Congress regarding the
permissible degree of policy judgment that can be left to those executing or
77 531 U.S. 457, 474-75 (2001) (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 416
(1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
78 This subconstitutional posture is also true of instances when the Court has construed
statutory delegations narrowly to avoid constitutional concerns.  On this practice, see John F.
Manning, The Nondelegation Doctrine as a Canon of Avoidance, 2000 Sup Ct. Rev. 223 (2000);
Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 315, 315-16 (2000).
79 See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460-61 (1991); William N. Eskridge Jr. &
Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules As Constitutional Lawmaking,
45 Vand. L. Rev. 593 (1992)
80 See Oregon v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 1118, 1125 (9th Cir. 2004).
81 126 S. Ct. 904, 925.  But see Gersen, supra note , at __ (arguing the Oregon majority
relied on the presumption against preemption).
82 See Watters, 127 S. Ct. at 1585-86; ADEC, 540 U.S. at 513.
83 541 U.S. 125, 130–31, 141 (2004).
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applying the law.’”77  To be sure, the scope of congressional delegations is still
subject to scrutiny, as Oregon demonstrates, but critically such scrutiny takes a
subconstitutional form, focusing on issues of statutory interpretation.78 
Congress’s constitutional ability to delegate broadly is accepted, and judicial
inquiry centers again on determining whether Congress in fact did so.
2.  The Absence of Subconstitutional Federalism Doctrines.  Interestingly,
in the five decisions the Court also eschewed overt reliance on subconstitutional
or quasiconstitutional federalism doctrines, specifically federalism-inspired
canons of statutory construction such as the presumption against preemption or
clear statement rules.79  Oregon is particularly noteworthy in this regard, as such
canons had provided one of the bases on which the Ninth Circuit below had
invalidated the interpretive rule.80  By contrast, the Supreme Court viewed the
challenge solely through an administrative law lens, holding that was
“unnecessary even to consider” application of such federalism-inspired canons to
conclude that the CSA did not delegate to the Attorney General the authority that
he claimed.81  
This exclusion of federalism canons sparked rebukes from dissenting
justices.82  But only in the 2004 decision in Nixon v. Missouri Municipal League
did a majority of the Court agree that invocation of a federalism-inspired clear
statement rule was appropriate.  And Nixon stands out from the mine run of most
administrative action in that at issue was whether a federal statute preempted
state’s regulation of local governments, rather than private parties—a feature that
had led even the federal agency involved, the Federal Communications
Commission, to conclude that clear evidence of a congressional desire to preempt
was required.83  
84 Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer all supported the claims of
federal power in Raich and rejected them here, whereas Justice Thomas rejected the claim of
federal power in Raich and upheld it here.  Justice Scalia was the lone member to affirm federal
power in both cases, while Justice O’Connor was the only one to vote against federal power on
both occasions.  Chief Justice Roberts, who dissented in Oregon, was not on the Court when Raich
was decided.
85 546 U.S. 243, 301-02.
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The Court’s general failure to invoke such federalism doctrines in these
decisions should not be surprising.  Clear statement requirements fit poorly in
administrative contexts.  After all, in these contexts Congress has clearly spoken;
it has delegated power to the federal agency to implement the regulatory scheme
at issue.  As Whitman demonstrates, the Court ordinarily does not require
Congress to clearly specify the bounds of administrative authority.  Insisting that
Congress do so when federal administrative action substantially impacts the
states, even if justifiable on federalism grounds, stands in sharp contrast to the
Court’s usual deference and respect for congressional regulatory choices.  
3.  Administrative Law as a Federalism Surrogate.  The Court’s
unwillingness to impose constitutional or subconstitutional federalism limits on
Congress does not mean a lack of concern with the implications of federal
regulatory action for the states.  On the contrary, such concern surfaces repeatedly
in the five decisions, in challenges to federal agency action as well as in more
obviously federalism contexts such as preemption litigation.   Critically, however,
the Court chose to address its federalism concerns from within the broad analytic
rubric of administrative law, rather than through more straightforward federalism
doctrines.
 The contrast between Raich and Oregon is singularly illustrative of this
point.  Although unsympathetic in Raich to claims that the CSA exceeded
Congress’s constitutional authority, the Court proceeded in Oregon to give voice
to concerns about the impact of the CSA on the states through its administrative
law analysis.  This reliance on administrative law in lieu of constitutional law
helps explain the striking change in position of many of the Justices between
Raich and Oregon.84   It also  sparked a plaintive complaint from Justice Thomas,
who remarked in Oregon that though he was sympathetic to the federalism
argument, “that is now water over the dam.  The relevance of such considerations
was at its zenith in Raich. . . . [but] have little, if any relevance where, as here, we
are merely presented with a question of statutory interpretation, and not the extent
of constitutionally permissible federal power.”85
Yet given the constitutional backdrop outlined above, the Court’s move to
addressing federalism concerns through an administrative law framework makes
sense.  Administrative law offers a means by which the Court can raise such
concerns while still respecting Congress’s regulatory authority.  Under an
administrative law framework, the target of the Court’s scrutiny is not Congress
but federal agencies.  Indeed, the courts can position themselves as agents of
86 Raich, 545 U.S. at 33; Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1454-55.
25
Congress, enforcing legislative will—whether in the form of particular
substantive requirements in organic statutes or the default demands of the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA)—against a recalcitrant executive branch. 
Moreover, scrutinizing agency determinations is an activity with which the courts
are quite familiar and for which they can draw on an established body of doctrine
independent of federalism analysis.
The decisions are much less clear about how exactly administrative law
performs this federalism surrogacy role.  Two seemingly distinct models emerge. 
In one, the Court stays well within the contours of standard administrative law,
with the connection to federalism lying simply in the fact that application of
standard doctrines redounds—or might redound—to the benefit of the states.  In
the other, appears to be giving federalism concerns special salience in its
administrative law analysis, either expressly invoking state interests or deviating
from standard doctrines in ways that help protect states against federal agency
overreaching.  This divergence in approach makes it difficult to reach any firm
conclusions about how the Court envisions administrative law’s surrogacy
role—as well as about whether the Court is consciously employing administrative
law as a federalism surrogate at all.  Yet this divergence should not obscure the
more important point, which is the dominance of administrative law paradigms
instead of express federalism doctrines in these decisions.  Thus, regardless of
whether the Court perceives administrative law as a federalism surrogate or not, it
is at least approaching these cases in a manner that allows for administrative law
to play such a role.
B. Ordinary Administrative Law and Federalism
The decisions are notable for their repeated invocation of ordinary
administrative law.  In particular, three standard features of administrative law
repeatedly surface: an emphasis on agency procedure; the requirement of
reasoned decisionmaking; and doctrines for reviewing agency statutory
interpretations.  For the most part, these staples of administrative law analysis are
not overtly connected to federalism.  In practice, however, their application
served the interests of the states involved.
1.  Administrative Procedure: Redress and Participation.  Administrative
procedure appears often in these decisions.  In some cases, the procedures
emphasized were administrative routes by which states could obtain seek to alter
federal requirements.  Thus, for example, Raich emphasized the option of
petitioning the Attorney General to have marijuana removed from Schedule I and
relisted as a Schedule II drug, while Massachusetts stressed that under the CAA
Massachusetts had the right to petition the EPA to issue rules regulating
greenhouse gas emissions.86  Similar emphasis on the importance of agency-level
87 540 U.S. 461, 501 n. 21.
88 EPA submitted its first letter on the proposed permit outside the window of the public
comment period, and appeared to act in response to points made by the National Park
Service—which did submit its comments on time.  See 540 U.S. at 508 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
And the majority itself characterized EPA’s orders against the state agency and the facility
involved as “skeletal” and “surely . . . not composed with ideal clarity.” 540 U.S. 461, 477-78,
497.
89See id. at 480, 493-94, 501. 
90 546 U.S. 243, 253; see also id. at 269 (noting “the apparent absence of any consultation
with anyone outside of the Department of Justice who might aid in a reasoned judgment” as a
factor weighing against granting the Attorney General’s views any deference).
91 See, e.g., Riegle-Neal, 12 U.S.C. § 43(a); 30 U.S.C. 1254(c) (requiring that the
Secretary of the Interior provide for notice and hearing in the affected state before promulgating or
implementing a federal program in lieu of state control under the Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act); 47 U.S.C. §§253(a), (d) (authorizing the FCC to preempt state law in certain
contexts but requiring that the agency proceed using notice-and-comment rulemaking); see also
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C. §§ 1531–32, 1535 (requiring agencies to
consider impacts on state, local, or tribal governments or the private sector for rules that might
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means of redress is evident in ADEC.  There, the Court underscored that EPA was
willing to reconsider its rejection of ADEC’s BACT determination if the state
submitted additional evidence, dismissing the dissent’s fears that this amounted to
a “piling of process upon process.”87
Administrative procedure also surfaces occasionally in these decisions as
a means of ensuring state participation and consultation in federal agency
decisions.  Again ADEC is illustrative; the majority described in detail EPA’s
repeated communications with ADEC over the proposed permit and the BACT
determination.  These communications, it should be noted, were procedurally
deficient and unnecessarily oblique.88  What appeared to matter more to the
majority, however, was that EPA had raised its concerns when the state agency
was formulating the permit and had suggested specific ways that the state could
satisfy these concerns.89  By contrast, lack of consultation is a theme the Oregon
majority returned to frequently, noting in particular that the Attorney General
failed to consult with Oregon notwithstanding Oregon’s express request to meet
“with Department of Justice officials should the Department decide to revisit the
application of the CSA to assisted suicide.”90 
Procedure—its use or nonuse—thus is clearly relevant to the Court, in
particular the opportunities states enjoy to express their concerns to federal
agencies and potentially obtain relief.  The Court is not alone in emphasizing
administrative procedure as a means of ensuring that federal agencies consider
state interests.   On occasion Congress has required that a federal agency engage
in notice-and-comment rulemaking or analogous participatory procedures before
displacing state regulatory authority.91  Even more common are requirements that
result in an annual expenditure of $100 million or more, and for such rules to consider alternatives
and select the alternative that is “least costly, most cost-effective, or least burdensome” or explain
why such an alternative was not chosen).  On the UMRA’s effect, see Elizabeth Garrett,
Framework Legislation and Federalism (forthcoming Notre Dame L. Rev).
92 See e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 717b-1(b) (siting of natural gas facilities); 5 U.S.C. 8508
(unemployment compensation regulations); 19 U.S.C. 3512, 3312 (dispute settlements under
GATT and NAFTA); 21 U.S.C. 1703 (implementation of national drug control policy).  See also
Sharkey, Preamble, supra at 254. 
93 See  Exec. Order 13132 § 6, 64 Fed. Reg. 43255, 43257–58 (1999) (requiring, “to the
extent practicable and permitted by law,” that an agency submit an impact statement whenever a
proposed regulation has federalism implications and imposes substantial direct compliance costs
on states that are not statutorily required or preempts state law).  EO 13132 also emphasizes the
importance of early consultation with state and local officials and of federal agencies’ relying on
state standards and regulation in policymaking generally.  See id. § 3, 64 Fed. Reg. at 43256.  The
EO replaced EO 12612, issued by president Reagan. 
94 See Exec. Order 12988, § 3(b)(2), 61 Fed. Reg. 4729, 4732 (Feb. 5, 1996).   See also
Exec. Order 12866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51735 (Sept. 30, 1993) (requiring agencies to “respect the role of
State, local, and tribal governments” by, where feasible, consulting states before imposing federal
regulatory requirements and seeking to minimize those burdens).
95 127 Sct 1438, 1454–55.
27
federal agencies consult with state and local officials in formulating policy.92  In
like vein, Executive Order 13132, which in substance dates back to President
Reagan, imposes consultation and impact assessment requirements on agencies
before they issue regulations with certain federalism implications, such as
preempting state law.93  A separate executive order requires that regulations
“specif[y] in clear language, the preemptive effect, if any,” they are to be given.94 
Yet the five decisions give little guidance as to why exactly procedure
matters from a federalism perspective.  Only in Massachusetts is a connection
between procedure and federalism expressly drawn, with the majority
emphasizing that Massachusetts was seeking to assert its statutory procedural
rights in arguing that the state was “entitled to special solicitude in our standing
analysis.”95  By contrast, the Raich majority insisted that the administrative
rescheduling procedure had “no relevance” to its federalism analysis.  Moreover,
the Raich majority nowhere mentioned that the rescheduling route was available
to the state of California (as opposed to the individual plaintiffs in the case),
which would have more clearly indicated an intent to use administrative
procedures to alleviate federalism tensions.  In ADEC and Oregon, meanwhile,
use or nonuse of procedures appears to factor primarily in the Court’s assessment
of the reasonableness of the agency actions at stake, rather than to provide an
independent basis for invalidation of agency action.  
Further complicating efforts to understand the role procedure plays in
these decisions is the lack of emphasis on notice-and-comment rulemaking. 
96 See Long Island Care at Home v. Coke, 127 S. Ct. 2339 (2007);  Nat'l Cable &
Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005);  United States v. Mead Corp,
533 U.S. 218 (2001).
97 See infra TAN (Part III.B.1).
98 Some would classify what I am here calling substantive dimensions of administrative
law—the reasoned decisionmaking demand and deference doctrines—as procedural.  See, e.g.,
Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures As Politics in Administrative Law, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 1749,
__ (2007).  Probably the most accurate characterization is to acknowledge that these administrative
law requirements are both substantive and procedural: substantive, because their most direct target
is the substance of an agency’s decisions; procedural, because scrutiny of substance will indirectly
affect an agency’s procedural choices and because in some cases the strength of scrutiny turns on
the procedures an agency used.  Indeed, substance and procedure are rarely far apart in
administrative law.  My intent in classifying these aspects of administrative law as substantive is
simply to contrast them with instances wherein the courts focus more directly on procedures, not to
deny they also have procedural implications.
99 Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,
43 (1983) (internal quotations omitted).
100  The exception is Watters, where the majority relied on direct statutory interpretation
and thus had no need to consider the agency’s reasoning. 
101 127 S.Ct. 1438, 1482; see also id. at 1463 (arguing that factors identified by EPA do
not “amount to a reasoned justification for declining to form a scientific judgment” and that “[i]f
the scientific uncertainty is so profound that it precludes EPA making a reasoned judgment as to
whether greenhouse gases contribute to global warming, EPA must say so”). Oregon is more
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Unlike other recent administrative law precedent in which such rulemaking is
given central importance,96 in these decisions the Court put little weight on its use
(in Watters and Massachusetts) or its nonuse (in Oregon and ADEC).  Yet, as
discussed in greater depth below,97 notice-and-comment rulemaking seems
particularly conducive to ensuring that states can force federal agencies to
respond to their concerns.  The failure to give it much emphasis here is thus
surprising, and calls into question perhaps the extent to which the Court intended
to draw a connection between federalism and administrative law.
2.  Reasoned Decisionmaking.  More “substantive” administrative law
doctrine also features prominently in these decisions.98  Perhaps the most
fundamental substantive administrative law demand is that an agency must
engage in reasoned decisionmaking—in the Court’s words, an agency must
“examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action
including a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.”99 
The requirement of reasoned decisionmaking appears in some form in four of the
five decisions.100  Even Massachusetts, which focused primarily on questions of
statutory interpretation, repeatedly criticized EPA on this front, concluding that
EPA had “offered no reasoned explanation for its refusal to decide whether
greenhouse gases cause or contribute to climate change.”101  The Massachusetts
devoted to parsing statutory text than Massachusetts, yet here too the Court makes note of factors
traditionally associated with reasoned decisionmaking—consistency, coherence, thoroughness,
expertise, openness to contrary views—in finding that the Attorney General’s interpretation did
not merit deference under Skidmore.  546 U.S. 243, 270.
102 127 S. Ct. at 1459; see supra TAN __.
103 See, e.g., 540 U.S. 486, 487-91 (emphasizing cogency and consistency of EPA’s
interpretation as well as limited authority EPA claimed); id. at 495-502 (determining that EPA’s
rejection of Alaska’s BACT determination was not arbitrary and capricious).  
104545 U.S. 1, 27 n.37.  The earlier 2002 FERC decision offered an even more direct
linkage between reasoned decisionmaking requirements and federalism, with the Court invoking
federalism implications in support of the agency’s policy choice.  The Court there ruled that even
if FERC could assert jurisdiction over bundled retail transmissions, the agency’s discretionary
choice not to do so in part because of the “implication for the States’ regulation of retail sales” was
justified.   New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 27-28 (2002).
105 See 540 U.S. at 495-502.
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majority’s willingness to rely on this ground is particularly striking, given that the
case arose out of a rulemaking petition denial, a context in which agency policy
choices usually receive great deference.102  Reasoned decisionmaking is also an
important underlying theme in ADEC, where the majority repeatedly
characterized EPA’s actions in terms traditionally associated with reasoned
agency determinations.103
  Here too, the decisions do not expressly link application of the reasoned
decisionmaking requirement to federalism.  Raich perhaps comes closest, with the
majority’s suggestion that marijuana’s continued listing as a schedule I drug
under the CSA might be arbitrary at the same time as it rejected a straightforward
federalism challenge to the CSA.104  Nonetheless, in practice application of this
basic administrative law demand served to protect state interests, by guarding
against federal agency overreaching at the states’ expense.  This is evident in
ADEC, even though the state was not successful on its claims; there, the majority
emphasized that the federal courts were available to protect states against
inequitable agency conduct and then reviewed the basis for EPA’s decision fairly
closely before sustaining it.105  
The Court’s failure to tie the reasoned decisionmaking requirement more
overtly to protecting state interests again leaves a number of questions
unanswered.  Most importantly, does the fact an agency decision will
substantially intrude on the states lead to a higher burden of justification or
greater scrutiny of the decision’s underlying basis?  Or to put the point in the
context of Raich, does the fact that a number of states have legalized medical use
of marijuana mean that the Attorney General’s refusal to reschedule it deserves
more searching scrutiny than lower courts had so far applied?  The majority’s
106546 U.S. 243, 255.
107 For characterization of Mead as adding a new step zero to the Chevron framework, see
Cass Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 Va. L. Rev. 187, 191 (2006).; see also Thomas W. Merrill,
The Mead Doctrine: Rules and Standards, Meta-Rules and Meta-Standards, 54 Ad. L. Rev. 807, 812-13
(2002).
108  See Massachusetts, 127 S.Ct. 1438, 1460 (concluding CAA unambiguously includes
carbon dioxide as an air pollutant and that EPA’s policy reasons for refusing to regulate carbon
dioxide conflict with “the clear terms” of the CAA); Watters, 127 S. Ct. 1559, 1572 (holding that
the NBA itself preempts state law and thus question of deference to the OCC’s view did not arise). 
Even ADEC, notwithstanding its statement that Chevron did not apply (and its subsequent
references to the reasonableness of EPA’s view of an ambiguous provision) has a step one air, with
language suggesting the majority believed EPA’s interpretation was the only plausible reading of
the statute.  See 540 U.S. 461, 490 (“We fail to see why Congress, having expressly endorsed an
expansive surveillance role for EPA in two independent CAA provisions, would then implicitly
preclude the Agency from verifying substantive compliance with the BACT provisions and,
instead, limit EPA’s superintendence to the insubstantial question whether state permitting
authority had uttered the key words “BACT.”)
109 Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 268; ADEC, 540 U.S. 461, 487–88, 493, 496.  The ADEC
majority itself did not expressly invoke Skidmore, but cites to other recent precedent that did so. 
See id. at 488 (citing Washington State Dept of Soc & Health Servs. v. Guardianship Estate of
Keffeler, 537 U.S. 371, 385 (2003) and United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 218, 234 (2001)).
110 546 U.S. 243, 268-73
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reaching out to call into question marijuana’s schedule I status suggests this, but it
never said so directly.
3.  Statutory Interpretation Doctrines.  Equally evident in these decisions
is reliance on general administrative law doctrines regarding when agency
statutory interpretations trigger deference.  Oregon is the most prominent
example here, with the majority insisting that “familiar principles” guided its
inquiry into the degree of deference due the Attorney General’s interpretive
rule.106  But all the decisions employed standard doctrinal frameworks to some
extent in their assessments of the merits of agency statutory interpretations.  Thus,
in current administrative law parlance Oregon is a Chevron step zero
determination, in that it focuses on determining whether the Attorney General was
delegated authority to act with legal force on the question of acceptable medical 
practice.107   Massachusetts and Watters, in turn, represent Chevron step one
determinations.108  Skidmore deference, the amorphous category of deference
accorded agency statutory interpretations not qualifying for deference under
Chevron, is expressly invoked in Oregon and ADEC.109
Once again, however, no opinion expressly describes these standard
deference doctrines as a means of addressing federalism concerns.  Here, it is
Oregon that comes closest, with its invocation of federalism concerns as one
reason not to defer, under either Chevron or Skidmore, to the Attorney General’s
interpretation of “legitimate medical purpose” as excluding assisted suicide.110 
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More importantly, in these decisions the Court subjected agency statutory
interpretations to unusually searching scrutiny, despite its invocation of standard
frameworks.  Whether the Court was actually creating a distinct approach to
reviewing agency statutory interpretations for use when agency interpretations
substantially impact the states is a question I discuss below.  But that possibility
does not remove the significance of the fact that the Court is invoking standard
doctrines for reviewing agency statutory interpretations.  At a minimum, this
reinforces the point that the Court sees these decisions predominantly through an
administrative law rubric, notwithstanding their federalism implications.
C. Special Federalism-Inspired Administrative Law
Ordinary administrative law thus surfaces regularly in these decisions and
generally operates to protect state interests.  Yet although the Court at points
emphasizes that fact, its failure to expressly link federalism and administrative
law raises the possibility that this state-protective impact is serendipitous.  
Moreover, as several of these decisions took the form of administrative law
challenges to federal agency action, the dominance of administrative law in them
is not surprising.  Hence, although the connections between federalism and
administrative law in these decisions are noteworthy, it remains open whether the
Court is intentionally using administrative law as a federalism surrogate.
Clearer evidence that the Court may be seeking to address federalism
concerns through administrative law comes from a number of instances at which
the decisions give special weight to federalism concerns in their application of
administrative law doctrines.  Although again rarely made explicit, the contrast
between the decisions and more standard application of the doctrines is striking,
and it seems quite likely that federalism underlies the variation.   While
supporting the conclusion that the Court’s is using administrative law as a
federalism surrogate, it is less clear whether these examples portend development
of a distinct form of administrative law for use when federal agency action raises
serious federalism concerns. 
1.  Massachusetts and Special Rules for State Standing.  The most obvious
instance of the Court giving special weight to federalism concerns is
Massachusetts’s suggestion of distinct standing rules for states.  As noted above,
exactly what the majority intends by its invocation of “special solicitude” for the
states in standing analysis is not obvious:  such solicitude might mean a generous
stance in determining whether the traditional standing trio of requirements is met,
or exempting the states from the traditional analysis altogether when their
sovereignty interests are implicated.  What is plain, however, is the majority’s
willingness to treat the states differently than other plaintiffs in challenging
federal administrative action, and to do so because of the states’ status as
sovereign entities within our federal union.  In short, Massachusetts seems to
represent a federalism-inspired deviation from standard administrative law.
111 127 S. Ct. at 1459.  For a defense of this assessment of Massachusetts’ statutory
reasoning, see infra TAN __ - __.
112 See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985).  True, review of rulemaking denials is
somewhat different then review of other inaction, in particular refusal to take enforcement action
in a particular case, given the presence of an agency explanation and additional
formalities—including, when the agency seeks public comment on a rulemaking petition (as EPA
did in Massachusetts) the presence of an agency record.  See 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1459; American
Horse Protection Assn., Inc. v. Lyng, 812 F.2d 1, 3-4 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Lisa Schultz Bressman,
Judicial Review of Agency Inaction: An Arbitrariness Approach, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1657 (2004);
Eric Biber, The Importance of Resource Allocation in Administrative Law: A Case Study of
Judicial Review of Agency Inaction under the Administrative Procedure Act (SSRN draft).
Nonetheless, the practical effects of searching judicial review of rulemaking denials are quite
similar:  agencies potentially would need to devote substantial resources to justifying denials, and
might be forced to undertake rulemakings that they deemed less pressing than others.
113 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2000).
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Interestingly, however, the majority made no mention of federalism in
addressing another administrative law issue centrally implicated in the case, the
standard for reviewing denials of rulemaking petitions.  Although the Court stated
that review of rulemaking denials “is ‘extremely limited’ and ‘highly
deferential,’” it nonetheless took a fairly aggressive interpretive stance in
concluding that § 202(a)(1) of the CAA prohibited EPA from refusing to regulate
carbon dioxide on general policy grounds.111  Moreover, Court elsewhere has
expressed concerns about subjecting agency nonenforcement decisions to judicial
scrutiny.112  A logical way that the majority could have justified undertaking more
rigorous review of the rulemaking denial here with limited precedential impact
was by again invoking Massachusetts’ status as a sovereign state.  Having lost its
sovereign power to regulate through statutory preemption, Massachusetts
arguably has a special right to demand review of whether the federal
government’s refusal to act accords with the governing statute.  That the majority
did not make this argument raises a real question about the extent to which it
intended to create a distinct administrative law to govern when federal action
impinges on the states.  Indeed, it casts doubt on the extent to which the majority
fully considered the relationship between federalism and administrative law at all.
2.  Heightened Substantive Scrutiny to Protect State Interests.  Other than
Massachusetts, none of the five decisions expressly invoked federalism as a
reason to adopt new doctrinal rules.  Yet most appeared to deviate from standard
administrative law, in particular involving exceptionally searching scrutiny of
governing statutes and agency decisionmaking.  
Massachusetts is one example.  Section 202(a)(1), the provision centrally
at issue there, combines reference to the Administrator’s judgment with
mandatory language requiring that the administrator set standards and seeming to
significantly limit the grounds on which he can refuse to do so.113  While the
majority’s interpretation of § 202(a)(1) as requiring that the Administrator reach a
114 See Watts & Wildermuth, supra note, at [p.3]; [add cites].
115 127 S. Ct. at 1462–63.   The majority also rejected EPA’s conclusion that carbon
dioxide was not a pollutant on Chevron step one grounds, concluding it was “foreclosed by
statutory text.”  Id. at 1460.  Here the Court’s determination of statutory clarity has more basis, for
as the majority noted, the statutory definition of air pollutant is extremely broad.  See id.; 42
U.S.C. 7602(g).  Yet viewing the definitional section in the context of the regulatory scheme as a
whole arguably undermines this clarity somewhat, for as Justice Scalia argued, the focus of the
CAA regulatory scheme in general is on limiting ambient air pollutants whose presence in the air
varies geographically. See 127 S.Ct. 1438, 1471 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Adler, supra note __ at 40; 
see also Freeman & Vermeule, supra note , at draft p.16 (“The NAAQS system does not seem
workable for greenhouse gases in part because states could never ensure compliance with federally
established concentration limits; those gases are emitted from many world-wide sources not under
their control.”).
116 12 U.S.C. §§ 24, 24a(g)(3)(A).
117 Id. § 484(a) (“No national bank shall be subject to visitorial powers except as
authorized by Federal law”).  Perhaps, as the majority argued, the close identification of national
banks and their operating subsidiaries, embodied in a statutory prescription that operating
subsidiaries engage only in activities national banks can engage in and conduct such activities
“subject to the same terms and conditions that govern the conduct of such activities by national
banks,” id. § 24a(g)(3)(A), justifies reading § 484(a) as extending to operating subsidiaries.  See
127 S. Ct. 1559, 1570–72.  But that move is certainly not textually mandated.  Moreover, the
Court’s precedent applying the section to preempt state oversight was similarly focused on
national banks.  See Barnett Bank v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 33-34 (1996).
33
judgment on whether to set standards based on particular factors may well be the
best reading, it is hard to claim that the provision is not ambiguous regarding the
extent of the agency’s discretion.114  Yet the Court reversed the agency on
Chevron step one grounds, concluding its interpretation was “divorced from
statutory text.”115 
The Court’s statutory analysis in Watters is another instance of an
expansive Chevron step one inquiry.   The authorization for operating subsidiaries
in the NBA is oblique, resting on the statute’s grant of “incidental powers” and a
separate act’s distinction between financial subsidiaries and other subsidiaries.116  
More importantly, accepting that the NBA authorized banks’ use of operating
subsidiaries, a point Michigan did not challenge, further inferences are required to
conclude that the NBA authorizes the use of state-chartered operating
subsidiaries or displacement of state supervision of such subsidiaries.  Notably,
§ 484(a), the NBA provision restricting state visitorial powers, only refers
expressly to national banks themselves.117  Perhaps, as the majority argued, the
close identification of national banks and their operating subsidiaries, embodied
in a statutory prescription that operating subsidiaries engage only in activities
national banks can engage in and conduct such activities “subject to the same
terms and conditions that govern the conduct of such activities by national
banks,” justifies reading § 484(a) as extending to operating subsidiaries.  But that
118 See 127 S. Ct. 1559, 1570–72; id. § 24a(g)(3)(A).
119 See Nat'l City Bank v. Turnbaugh, 463 F.3d 325, 331(4th Cir. 2006); Wachovia
Bank, N. A. v. Burke, 414 F.3d 305, 315-18 (2d Cir. 2005); 431 F.3d 556, 561 (6th Cir. 2005);
Wells Fargo Bank, N. A. v. Boutris, 419 F.3d 949, 959 n. 12 (9th Cir. 2005).
120 See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461–63 (1997); Thomas Jefferson Univ. v.
Shalala, 512 U.S. 504 (1994); see generally John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial
Deference to Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 612 (1996).  
121 546 U.S. 243, 258. While perhaps a good reason not to grant deference, this anti-
parroting rule was not an established “familiar principle” but instead a creation of the Oregon
majority. 
122 21 U.S.C. §§ 821, 871(b).
123 126 S. Ct. 904, 917. 
124 21 U.S.C. § 824(a)(4), 822(a)(2).  
125 See, e.g., Whitman v. American Trucking Assns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457 (2001); National
Broadcast. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943). 
34
move is certainly not textually mandated.118  Instead, as the appeals courts
addressing the question had generally concluded, the NBA appears ambiguous on
the question of whether states can exercise supervisory authority over state-
chartered subsidiaries of national banks.119 
Oregon is a third example of the Court subjecting federal agency actions
to unusually searching scrutiny.   Most notably, the requirement that prescriptions
of controlled substances must serve a “legitimate medical purpose” was imposed
by an earlier Attorney General regulation and ordinarily administrative agencies’
interpretations of their own rules receive substantial deference.120  But the
majority refused to grant deference here on the novel ground that the regulation at
issue merely parroted statutory language.121  Similarly, the CSA expressly
delegated authority to the Attorney General to “promulgate rules and
regulations . . . . relating to the registration and control of the . . . dispensing of
controlled substances.”122  Such express delegations are usually read expansively,
but the majority here was far less generous, concluding that the Attorney
General’s authority was limited to changing a substance’s classification schedule
and guarding against diversion.123  In addition, The CSA authorizes the Attorney
General to deny, suspend, or revoke a physician’s registration if the registration is
“inconsistent with the public interest.”124  Terms such as “the public interest” are
frequently viewed as conveying broad policymaking authority—indeed, the more
commonly voiced concern is that such a delegation leaves the responsible agency
official essentially unconstrained in setting policy.125  The majority, however,
126 Although deviating from administrative law precedent in these ways, the result in
Oregon is nonetheless defensible as a straightforward exercise in statutory interpretation.  The
Attorney General’s broad assertion of power ill fits the CSA as a whole, which clearly intended the
Secretary of HHS and the states to play a major role in regulating medical practice.  Cf. Lisa
Schultz Bressman, Deference and Democracy, 75 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 761, 787 (2007) (arguing
that Oregon could have been decided on Chevron step two grounds, as representing an
unreasonable agency interpretation)
127  For example, the courts repeatedly refused to overturn the FAA’s Age 60 rule, despite
their concerns about the agency’s continued adherence to the rule.  See, e.g., Yetman v. Garvey,
261 F.3d 664, 672 (7th Cir. 2001); Professional Pilots Federation (PPF) v. FAA, 118 F.3d 758
(D.C. Cir. 1997) (upholding FAA’s age 60 rule).  Congress recently enacted legislation raising the
mandatory retirement age to 65.  49 U.S.C.A. § 44729 (2007) (P.L. 110-135; 121 Stat. 1450).
128 Massachusetts may be an exception here; what seems to be driving the Court there are
instead separation of powers concerns—specifically, the belief that the Bush Administration was
failing to comply with a clear congressional instruction because of its differing policy views.  Of
course, given the importance of representation of the states in Congress to our federalism system,
it is not difficult to translate the Court’s insistence on the executive branch’s fidelity to
congressional lawmaking into federalism terms.  But it is not clear from the decision, even with the
reference to special state standing, that the Court itself did so.
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viewed this provision narrowly and rejected the Attorney General’s claim that it
authorized him to determine that assisted suicide was not in the public interest.126
Even Raich can be grouped as an instance of unusually searching scrutiny. 
No petition to reschedule marijuana was before the Court.  Moreover, as the
majority noted, prior challenges to the federal government’s refusal to reschedule
marijuana had been rebuffed—not surprisingly, as the proper listing of marijuana
would seem to be the type of determination requiring scientific expertise and
touching on safety concerns to which the courts usually are quite deferential.127 
Yet the Court went out of its way to suggest that the evidence of marijuana’s
medicinal potential might require rescheduling.  
Not only did the Court undertake fairly exacting scrutiny in these
decisions, its doing so appears driven in large part by federalism concerns.128  For
example, the Watters majority’s reliance on independent scrutiny of the NBA
instead of deferring to the OCC’s interpretation—particularly given that both
approaches produced the same result—seems only explained as an effort to avoid
the federalism concerns associated with administrative preemption.  And the
Oregon majority was clearly concerned that the interpretive rule undermined the
federal-state balance embodied in the CSA.  Similarly, it is hard to explain why
the Court in Raich would suggest that marijuana’s listing as a Schedule 1 drug
was unsupported except to signal that administrative relisting represented a means
of navigating the specific federalism tensions in that case.  
Thus, the searching scrutiny in these decisions is evidence that the Court
is using administrative law analysis to address federalism concerns.  But use of
such scrutiny these decisions does not clearly put them outside the pale of
ordinary administrative law.  Watters and Massachusetts are hardly alone in
129 See  Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005),
MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218 (1994).  See also Thomas Merrill, Textualism
and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 Washington U. L. Rev. 351 (1994); Cass Sunstein,
Chevron Step Zero, supra note _; Thomas Miles & Cass Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory
Policy? An Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. Chi. L. Rev. 823 (2006); Lisa Schultz
Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency Action, 58 Vand. L. Rev. 1443
(2005); Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern Skidmore Standard,
107 Colum. L. Rev. 1235 (2007). Sasha Volokh, Choosing Interpretive Methods: A Positive Theory of
Judges and Everyone Else, 83 NYU L. Rev. _, _ (forthcoming 2008).
130 [stat cites]; see infra note __ and accompanying text (IV.A.2).
131 Compare  Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co.,
463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) with Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633 (1990); see
also Freeman & Vermeule, supra note , at 26-29 (viewing Massachusetts as hearkening back to
pre-Chevron vision of administrative law under which independence and expertise are prized over
political accountability).
132 See Brown & Williamson v. FDA, 529 U.S. 120, __ (2000); see also Bressman,
Democracy, supra note , at 765–66, 799, 803 (arguing that Brown, Oregon and Massachusetts
could all be seen as rare instances in which the Court is requiring agencies to exercise its authority
in a democratically reasonable fashion).
133 See Nina A. Mendelson, A Presumption Against Agency Preemption, 102 Nw. U. L.
Rev. _, _ (forthcoming 2008); Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and Institutional Choice, 102 Nw.
U. L. Rev. _, _ (forthcoming 2008).  One exception to this consensus is Bradford Clark, who has
argued that only laws adopted pursuant to Article I, Section 7 qualify as “Laws of the United
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embodying vigorous Chevron step one inquiries, and indeed the appropriate scope
of step one has long been a source of debate.129  Courts also vary in the strength of
their scrutiny of agency reasoning, often applying more intense “hard look”
review to notice-and comment rulemaking, the type of procedure involved in
rescheduling decisions under the CSA and emissions-setting under the CAA.130 
Moreover, courts sometimes undertake more intensive scrutiny of agency
decisionmaking when a basis exists to conclude that politics or ideology led an
agency to ignore contrary facts.131  Nor, finally, does the Court require detailed
evidence of an agency’s authority to regulate only in federalism contexts.132  In
short, whatever its doctrinal formulae state, as a practical matter administrative
law embraces a range of deference; the divide between ordinary and extraordinary
here is far from stark. 
D. Administrative Preemption
The current debate over administrative preemption merits special note, for
it is in this context that the relationship between federalism and administrative
law has surfaced most prominently.  This debate accepts that substantive
requirements imposed by federal agencies, for example through legislative rules,
can preempt state law.133  But disagreement exists over who should have primary
States” for purposes of the Supremacy Clause, a test that administrative regulations of course fail. 
See Clark, supra note , at 1342–46.  The Supreme Court has clearly held, however, that valid
federal administrative rules preempt conflicting state law.  See Fidelity Fed. Savings & Loan
Association v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 154, 159–167 (1982); United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S.
374, 381, 383 (1961) 
134 See Watters, 127 S. Ct. 1559, 1584 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Mendelson,
Chevron, supra note _ at _ ; Sharkey, PLP, supra note _ at _ .
135 See Thomas W. Merrill, supra note _ at _ (arguing for a “super-strong clear statement
rule” before “permit[ting] agencies to preempt on their own authority.”).  This also is Nina
Mendelson’s current view.   See Presumption, supra note _ at _ (arguing for a presumption against
agency preemption).
136 On several prior occasions the Court has similarly avoided taking a position on the
level of deference due agency interpretations, although specific justices have voiced positions. See
Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 883–86 (2000) (stating that DOT’s position that
federal regulatory standard preempted state tort action at issue accorded “Some weight,” but
deference unnecessary to conclude preemption appropriate); id. at 911 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(arguing deference to agency views in legal brief inappropriate); Medtronic, Inc. v. V. Lohr, 518
U.S. 470, 496 (1996) (stating that concluding that its determination that statute did not preempt
state tort claims was “substantially informed” by federal regulations and that the agency’s views of
the statute should be given ‘considerable weight”); id. at 505 (Breyer, J., concurring) (arguing that
agencies should have “a degree of leeway” to determine preemptive effect of ambiguous statutes);
id. at 512 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“It is not certain that an agency regulation determining the
pre-emptive effect of any federal statute is entitled toe deference.”); Smiley v. Citibank (South
Dakota) N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 744 (1996) (assuming arguendo that the question of whether a statute
is preemptive “must always be decided de novo by the courts”).
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authority to interpret the preemptive scope of agency rules or the statutes agencies
are charged with implementing.  Ordinarily such agency interpretations would
qualify for Chevron deference, assuming the rule or statute at issue was
ambiguous.  However, the dramatic recent increase in agency interpretations of
agency rules and statutes as broadly preempting state law (including state tort
law) has led a number of scholars and jurists to conclude that agency preemption
interpretations should receive more limited Skidmore deference or perhaps no
deference at all.134  Put differently, they argue for development of a special
federalism-inspired deference doctrine for preemption contexts.  Some go further
and argue that agencies’ ability to issue preemptive interpretations be limited to
instances where Congress has clearly and specifically granted them that
authority.135  
Whether (and in what way) courts should defer to agency preemption
determinations is the question the Court evaded in Watters.  The Watters’
majority reliance on an expansive Chevron step one inquiry in lieu of deferring to
the OCC might signal that these justices at least had doubts about the
appropriateness of Chevron deference in the preemption context.136  On the other
hand, the majority’s failure to acknowledge the unusual breadth of its statutory
137 Richard Nagareda has argued that concerns about a regulatory scheme’s impact on the
states could be used to reinforce the quality and efficacy of federal regulation.  See Nagareda,
supra note __, at 16–17, 40–48 (stating that “the real concern over FDA preemption is not the
broad-brush one that it would shut off tort litigation but, more precisely, that it might do so for too
little in return” and arguing that tort preemption concerns should be repackaged as arguments for
forcing information disclosure to the FDA).
138 In his amicus brief on behalf of Michigan in Watters, my colleague Tom Merrill
argued that while in general agencies and courts are equally competent to interpret federal statutes,
“the decision to displace state law . . . implicates a wide range of systemic variables as to which
the judiciary has a superior claim.”  Brief of the Center for State Enforcement of Antitrust and
Consumer Protection Laws, Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 6-8, Watters, 127
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investigation may indicate some ambivalence about devising special
administrative law doctrines to reflect federalism concerns.
Although punting on this deference question, Watters and the other
decisions in the federalism-administrative law quintet carry important
implications for the administrative preemption debate.  In particular, the decisions
reveal the theoretical limitations of the current debate, which tends to portray
federalism and administrative law as inherently in conflict, thereby obscuring the
possibility that administrative law could serve as a means of reinforcing
federalism—and vice versa.137   While tensions certainly exist between federalism
and administrative law mindsets, the five decisions demonstrate that the
relationship between these two doctrinal lines is much more complicated than one
of straightforward conflict.
The decisions further suggest that administrative preemption debate is
additionally unduly narrow by focusing specifically on the appropriateness of
granting Chevron deference to agency preemption interpretations.  Such a focus
ignores the opportunities for addressing federalism concerns within the full
Chevron inquiry, which includes investigation of an agency’s delegated authority
at step zero (as in Oregon) and independent assessment of statutory meaning at
step one (as in Massachusetts and Watters).  It also overlooks the potential for
ensuring that agencies are attentive to the impact of their decisions on the states
through arbitrary and capriciousness review (as in ADEC and Raich).  The
Chevron focus further means that the administrative preemption debate centers on
judicial review, when it may well be that other mechanisms, such as procedural
requirements on agencies or structuring federal programs to incorporate reliance
on state administration, are better means of ensuring that federalism concerns are
incorporated into federal agency decisionmaking.
Finally, the narrow Chevron focus also serves to obscure the fact that
administrative preemption is simply one of several instances in which
administrative law and federalism intersect.  It is unclear, for example, why courts
should deny deference to express agency assessments of preemption or require
express delegation of power to preempt, but then defer to agency substantive
determinations that restrict state regulatory choices.138  Yet not granting deference
S.Ct. 1559 (No. 05-1342), 2006 WL 2570991 6-8.  These variables are that displacement: presents
a constitutional question, specifically the Supremacy Clause and the constitutional structure of
federalism; entails application of law developed by courts; and implicates considerations of
federalism and agency power best not left to agency control.  None of these factors, to my mind,
suffices to the distinguish agency decisions expressly addressing the preemptive scope of statutes
or regulations from other agency determinations.  Preemption determinations are not constitutional
determinations in any active sense; far more central than the Supremacy Clause are issues relating
to statutory requirements and functional needs of a regulatory scheme, precisely the types of issues
on which, under Chevron, reasonable agency determinations should govern.  In any event, the
Supremacy Clause seems implicated to the same extent when an agency issues substantive
regulations that preclude the states from adopting a contrary regulatory approach, so if taken
seriously this argument precludes Chevron deference in a very broad range of cases.  Similarly,
even if an agency invokes established preemption doctrine, its determinations regarding
preemption also implicate policy concerns, such as the need for uniformity, predictability, and
centralization in an area of federal regulation.  Whether federal agencies can be trusted to address
questions of the federal-state balance fairly is a complicated issue and is discussed in Part III.A
infra.  But at a minimum, if indeed agencies cannot be trusted to take federalism concerns
seriously, again that should have implications outside the administrative preemption context.
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to agency determinations whenever they impact state regulatory interests or
demanding specific delegation of preemptive authority would fundamentally
undermine the modern federal administrative state.  Taking a broader perspective
allows for a fuller and more nuanced assessment of the costs and benefits of
special federalism-inspired administrative rules.  
III.  ASSESSING THE USE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
AS A FEDERALISM SURROGATE
The discussion up to now has focused on establishing that the Court is
increasingly attentive to the relationship between federalism and administrative
law, and further that it may be using administrative law as a surrogate by which to
address federalism concerns raised by federal administrative action.  Now I want
to switch focus and assess how well suited administrative law is to playing this
surrogacy role.  Two questions are central to such an assessment.  First, is it
legitimate for the Court to advance state interests through administrative law,
particularly if it is not willing to impose constitutional limits?  Second, how likely
is administrative law to be an adequate federalism surrogate?
A. The Legitimacy of Administrative Law’s Use as a Federalism
Surrogate
Injecting federalism concerns into administrative law is open to criticism
as an illegitimate intrusion on congressional power.  As noted, the Court is
unwilling to curb Congress’s regulatory authority on constitutional grounds. 
Even if it were, most of the administrative actions at issue in these decisions—
regulation of national banking, pollution emissions, prescription of controlled
139  The classic statement of this line of argument, raised in conjunction with the
constitutional avoidance canon, comes in Richard A. Posner, The Federal Courts: Challenge and
Reform 285 (1985).  See also William N. Eskridge Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional
Law: Clear Statement Rules As Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 Vand. L. Rev. 593, 633-36 (1992)
(describing argument against enforcing federalism indirectly through clear statement rules).
140 Cf Manning, supra note , at 254 (arguing that the “canon of constitutional avoidance
does no work unless used to depart from the most likely or natural meaning of a statute”).
141 Of course, judicial review of administrative action can also be critiques as lacking
basis in constitutional or statutory text—and often is.  For a classic example, see Vermont Yankee
[cite]; see also U.S. v. Mead, cite (Scalia, J., dissenting); John Duffy, Tex L. Rev. [cite].  But such
criticisms are not unique to review of administrative action that implicates federalism concerns,
and so are (largely) outside the scope of this article.
142  See supra Part II.A.
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substances—would fall fairly easily within the category of commercial activity
with interstate effects.  So it might be argued that if Congress acts within its
constitutional powers in regulating an area and in delegating responsibility to
administrative agencies to implement its regulatory scheme, then courts lack a
basis for imposing additional federalism-inspired restrictions on subsequent
agency determinations.139  
This complaint has little force if all that administrative law’s surrogacy
role involves is the Court employing ordinary administrative law in a manner that
redounds to the states’ benefit.  In such a case, invocation of federalism values
and concerns is not necessary to justify the results the Court reaches,140 and the
basis for the Court’s actions is the same as underlies its review of administrative
action generally.141  Even express invocation of federalism concerns, if kept
within the established parameters of ordinary administrative law, seems
unproblematic.  To conclude that any express invocation of federalism in review
of agency action represents judicial usurpation of Congress’s policysetting role
requires the highly dubious presumption that, unless it states otherwise, Congress
prefers that agencies not take state interests into account.
But creation of special administrative law requirements to protect state
interests might seem more vulnerable to the critique that courts are illegitimately
intruding on congressional turf.  Although its administrative law framing
analytically distinguishes such an approach from straightforward federalism
doctrines,142 such extraordinary federalism-inspired administrative law is similarly
categorizable as a species of subconstitutionalism, as it also involves an effort to
address constitutional values through means other than direct constitutional
adjudication.  Several critics have raised similar legitimacy concerns regarding
143 See, e.g.,Viet Dinh, Reassessing the Law of Preemption, 88 Geo. L. J. 2085 (2000);
Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 Va. L. Rev. 225 (2000); Jack Goldsmith, Statutory Foreign Affairs
Preemption, 2000 Sup. Ct. Rev. 175 (2000).  Of course, the presumption against preemption also
has its defenders.  See Gardbaum, supra note Stephen Gardbaum, Rethinking Constitutional
Federalism, 74 Texas L. Rev. 795 (1996); Ernest A. Young, Two Cheers for Process Federalism,
46 Vill. L. Rev. 1349, 1385–89  (2001); see also Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against Preemption:
Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the National Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 1, 17-36 (2007) (defending a clear statement anti-preemption rule).
144  Such requirements are faulted for misunderstanding how Congress functions, creating
significant practical hurdles that Congress surmounts only with some difficulty, and they are more
generally critiqued as unwarranted interference with a co-equal branch.  See William N. Eskridge
Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules As Constitutional
Lawmaking, 45 Vand. L. Rev. 593, 637-39 (1992);  Philip Frickey & Steven Smith, Judicial
Review, the Congressional Process, and the Federalism Cases: An Interdisciplinary Critique, 111
Yale L.J. 1707, 1740-45 (2002), 1740-45; see also William W. Buzbee & Robert A. Schapiro,
Legislative Record Review, 54 Stan. L. Rev. 87, 121-25 (2001); A. Christopher Bryant & Timothy
J. Simeone,  Remanding to Congress: The Supreme Court's New “On the Record” Constitutional
Review of Federal Statutes, 86 Cornell L. Rev. 328, 370-73, 387-89 (2001); Ruth Coelker &
James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 80, 86-87, 116, 119-20 (2001); see also
Frank B. Cross, Realism About Federalism, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1304, 1329-30 (represents a
cooption of Congress’s political role). 
145 See, e.g., Spector v. Norweigian Cruise Line Ltd., 545 U.S 119, 138-39 (2005)
(invoking canon that statutes will not be read to apply extraterritorially unless Congress clearly
states otherwise); Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 277, 239-40 (1999) (describing the practice of
construing statutes to avoid constitutional doubts “beyond debate”);  Eskridge & Frickey, supra
note , (documenting numerous examples arising in the form of clear statement rules and
presumptions); see also Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive branch,
106 Colum. L. Rev. 1189 (2006) (analyzing invocations of the avoidance canon within the
executive branch).
146 Cf. [CITES Bickel/Wechsler.]
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the presumption against preemption,143 clear-statement rules and other process
requirements imposed on Congress in the name of federalism.144  
This legitimacy critique of using administrative law as a surrogate for
federalism concerns is not ultimately persuasive.  To begin with,
subconstitutionalism is a common feature of our legal landscape.  Numerous clear
statement requirements and constitutionally-derived statutory presumptions exist
outside the federalism area, with the perhaps most prominent example being the
practice of construing statutes narrowly to avoid constitutional concerns.145  Even
many prudential measures used to mitigate the disruption of judicial
review—presumptions of severability, abstention doctrines, and the like—qualify
as instances of subconstitutionalism, as these are all instances when the courts
take background constitutional concerns into account in exercising their authority
without directly ruling on these concerns.146  That descriptive fact alone may not
be a very satisfying justification for continuing the practice, but it is important to
take cognizance of what a full-scale rejection of this practice might entail.  
147 See Philip p. Frickey, Getting from Joe to Gene (McCarthy): The Avoidance Canon,
Legal Process Theory, and Narrowing Statutory Interpretation in the Early Warren Court, 93 Cal.
L. Rev. 399, 452–54 (2005).
148 See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note , at 637-39; John F. Manning, The Nondelegation
Doctrine as a Canon of Avoidance, 2000 Sup Ct. Rev. 223, 254-55 (2000); Frederick Schauer,
Ashwander Revisited, 1995 Sup. Ct. Rev. 71.
149 But see Schauer, supra note , at __; Jerry L. Mashaw, Greed, Chaos, and Governance
105 (1997).
150 Frickey, supra note 143, at 455-59; Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 315, 337-400 (2000) (defending nondelegation canons despite lack of direct
enforcement of constitutional limits on delegation).
151 See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note , at 637; Manning, supra note , at 255; Schauer,
supra note at ; Adrian Vermeule, Saving Constructions, 85 Geo. L. J. 1945, 1960-61 (1997); see
also William K. Kelley, Avoiding Constitutional Questions as a Three-Branch Problem, 86
Cornell. L. Rev. 831 (2001)
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A number of normative arguments can also be made in
subconstitutionalism’s defense.  It minimizes head-on constitutional clashes
between the Court and the elected branches and potentially offers greater room
for constitutional dialogue.147  True, clear statement and other process
requirements can pose real obstacles for Congress, given the difficulty involved in
getting new clarifying legislation enacted.148  Even so, this impact is potentially
less restrictive than direct judicial invalidation of a measure on constitutional
grounds, since Congress at least retains the option of reenactment.149  In addition,
a subconstitutional approach may be better at ensuring that constitutional values
are given weight in governmental decisionmaking, as courts may be more
reluctant to enforce such values when doing so entails invalidating congressional
or executive action.150  Indeed, the strength of this last point often fuels the attack
on subconstitutionalism as an abuse of judicial authority:  Courts can play fast
and loose with constitutional review because they do not have to resolve
constitutional challenges decisively or face the full consequences of their
constitutional rulings.151  Clearly, much turns here on whether underenforcement
or overenforcement of constitutional norms is seen as the prime danger.  But it is
hard to insist that subconstitutionalism necessarily enlarges judicial power;
whether it does so turns a great deal on factors such as the degree to which the
constitutional concerns invoked by courts are well-established, the extent of
clarity courts require from other branches, and judicial transparency and care in
specifying why constitutional concerns are implicated.
What this suggests is that subconstitutionalism’s legitimacy cannot really
be established as a general matter; much turns on the specifics of its
152 Cf. Manning, supra note (critiquing the canon of constitutional avoidance specifically
as it is used to address nondelegation concerns).
153 See, e.g., Clark, supra note, at 1323-25, 1425-30; Philip P. Frickey, The Fool on the
Hill: Congressional Findings, Constitutional Adjudication, and United States v. Lopez, 46 Case W.
Res. L. Rev. 695, 720-22 (1996) (defending process elements of Lopez); Vicki C. Jackson,
Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and Principle?, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 2180, 2240
(1998); Stephen Gardbaum, Rethinking Constitutional Federalism, [CITE Tex L rev]; Ernest A.
Young, Two Cheers for Process Federalism, 46 Vill. L. Rev. 1349, 1358-59 (2001).
154 See Young, Making Federalism Doctrine, supra note ,  at 1762–63, 1775-99, 1836;
Young, Blowing Smoke, supra note , at ; Young, Two Federalisms, supra note at __.
155  Making Federalism Doctrine, at 1748, 1754. See also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S.
898  Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322 (1934); Printz v. United States, 521
U.S. 898 (1997).
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application.152  The question then becomes assessing the legitimacy of the specific
subconstitutional practice of devising special administrative law doctrines to
enforce federalism.  This, in turn, implicates two separate issues:  Should
federalism be judicially enforced through subconstitutional means?  And if so, is
adapting administrative law in this fashion to do so appropriate?  
The first of these, whether federalism merits subconstitutional
enforcement, has received substantial attention elsewhere.  A number of scholars
have defended a role for the courts in ensuring that Congress takes state interests
seriously, even when Congress has constitutional authority to trump state
regulation or impose burdens on the states.  Often dubbed process federalism, the
doctrinal impositions defended include requirements that Congress speak clearly
when burdening the states and adequately consider the impact a federal measure
will have on the states.  Rather than being at odds with reliance on political
safeguards as the central federalism protection, judicial imposition of such
requirements is portrayed as necessary to ensure that Congress is aware of and
adequately considers the federalism implications of its actions.153  Ernest Young
has offered perhaps the most elaborate justification for process federalism as a
supplement (if not lieu of) direct constitutional enforcement of enumerated power
limits.  Acknowledging that the Court has little taste for curtailing the
constitutional scope of congressional power, and that such curtailment ill-fits the
development of a nationally integrated economy, Young argues that process
federalism represent a justified attempt to recreate the federalism principle of
balance and division between federal and state governments in current realities.154 
While no constitutional provision imposes such process requirements, that is true
generally of federalism, which manifests as a background structural principle
more than as a clear textual limit.155   
These arguments demonstrate that, in theory, subconstitutional federalism
can accord well with our constitutional structure.  The more serious concern is
that, in practice, operation of federalism-based clarity or deliberation
156 See Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29 (1983); see also Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967
(2005) (agency can change its regulatory approach but has to explain).  Indeed, the Court’s
decisions imposing process-based limits on Congress are often attacked on the grounds that
Congress is not an administrative agency.  See Bryant & Simeone, supra note __,  at 337, 370;
Buzbee & Schapiro, supra note __ , at 90–91, 97, 119; see also Cross, supra note , at 1331-32.
157 See, e.g., United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240 (2nd Cir.
1977).  Most agency actions invalidated for failing to comply with the APA’s requirements for
notice-and-comment rulemaking represent instances when an agency has power to act through
rulemaking, but has failed to do so properly.
158  See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw & David L. Harfst, The Struggle for Auto Safety (1990)
Thomas O. McGarrity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 Duke L. J.
1385 (1992); Cross, at 1331–32.  But see William Jordan, Ossification Revisited: Does Arbitrary
and Capricious Review Significantly Interfere with Agency Ability to Achieve Regulatory Goals
Through Informal Rulemaking?, 94 Northwestern University Law Review 393 (2000); O’Connell,
add cite to piece on unified agenda; Mark Seidenfeld, Demystifying Deossification: Rethinking
Recent Proposals to Modify Judicial Review of Notice and Comment Rulemaking,  75 Tex. L.
Rev. 483 (1997).
159 See Clark, supra note , at __; Young, Two Federalisms, supra note , at 69.   Indeed, the
extent to which judicial review restricts agency rulemaking is a matter of debate, and may vary a
great deal by agency.  Compare O’Connell and Jordan with ?Mashaw & Harbst. [CITES
NEEDED]  Of course, a critical component of the burden imposed by judicial invalidation is the
need to compromise on substance to get reenactment, see Eskridge & Ferejohn, The Article I,
Section 7 Game, which is harder to measure. 
44
requirements seriously impedes Congress’s exercise of its enumerated powers and
leads to excessive judicial regulation of the functioning of a coequal branch. 
Here, an important point to emphasize is that these practical concerns are
considerably abated when federalism is enforced through administrative law
rather than through constraints on Congress.  Unlike Congress, federal
administrative agencies are already required to seek and respond to comments and
explain their policy choices.156  Judicial scrutiny of agency functioning is a
constant and everyday aspect of administrative agency existence, and courts
invalidate agency actions when agency actions exceed their authority or when
agencies have failed to satisfy procedural requirements or to provide an adequate
justification for their decisions.157  To be sure, such invalidations can create
significant obstacles for agencies to overcome, and attacks on judicial review for
ossifying agency rulemaking are a well-worn component of the administrative
law oeuvre.158  But the burdens of notice-and-comment rulemaking are in practice
considerably less onerous than bicameralism and presentment.159  In any event,
160 Moreover, it is also possible that agencies are better able to overcome the burdens and
costs imposed from procedural constraints than Congress is.  See Hillsborough County v.
Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc. 471 U.S. 707, 721 (1985).  
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federalism-inspired requirements seem unlikely to add significantly to the
burdens that agencies already face in the rulemaking context.160  
Nor does administrative law enforcement of federalism lose the political
safeguards justification that animates process federalism.  True, given its focus on
administrative agencies, this approach does not reinforce the political salience of
federalism in Congress.  Yet such administrative law enforcement still functions
to reinforce political safeguards insofar as it gives additional weight to state
interests in executive branch policy debates.  Moreover, the administrative law
approach arguably indirectly reinforces congressional political safeguards, by
presuming that Congress would want agencies to take state interests into account
unless it clearly indicates otherwise.  What this approach does not do is to require
that Congress clearly authorize administrative agencies to impose burdens on the
states; nor does it read congressional delegations as presumptively displacing
federalism.  Those further moves are species of federalism doctrine, and in
practice function to allow state interests to trump all other considerations that
factor into agency decisionmaking.  Instead, the administrative law approach
insists on the need to take account of both national and state interests in
administrative contexts.  State interests are given weight, but through an
administrative law framework that also allows consideration of other factors. 
This seems both more likely to accord with congressional intent and more in tune
with our constitutional scheme than approaches that insist on either national or
state interests being given trumping priority.
B. Is Administrative Law an Adequate Federalism Surrogate?
A separate objection to using administrative law as a federalism surrogate
is that, even if legitimate, this approach will fail to offer adequate protection to
state interests.   Assessing this objection necessitates an account of what it means
to be an adequate federalism surrogate.  In particular, does being an adequate
federalism surrogate require providing a venue for expressly asserting state
interests, or is simply advancing these interests—however tacitly and
indirectly—enough?  Does it require bottom line success in derailing proposed
administrative actions that adversely impact the states, or is it sufficient to ensure
that state interests receive careful consideration by federal officials?  And which
types of state interests matter:  Do state interests lie in having the federal
government pursue the policy preferences of their residents or elected officials co,
or should the focus be on preserving the states’ own independent power to govern
and freedom from federal regulatory impositions? 
Of these questions, the last is the easiest to answer.  As others have
argued, protecting the states’ regulatory role is most central to the federalism
161 See Larry Kramer, Putting the Politics Back Into Political Safeguards, 100 Colum. L.
Rev. 215, __ (2000); Young, Two Federalisms, supra note ___, at ___.
162 See, e.g., Stephen Gardbaum, supra note _ at 826; Vicki Jackson, supra note _, at __.
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project; what distinguishes states from other interest groups and gives their
demands special normative force is their status as sovereign entities.161  In
addition, some express invocation of state interests seems necessary to preserve
the reliability of administrative law’s surrogacy role.  A practice of vindicating
state regulatory interests only tacitly is too easily discarded and too hidden to
clearly instruct agencies or lower courts.  Similarly, a lack of any bottom-line
success in defeating measures that adversely impact the state might call into
question the ability of administrative law to offer meaningful protection to such
federalism concerns.  On the other hand, significant bottom-line success cannot be
the measure of adequacy here.  Such a measure is too much at odds with the basic
presumption underlying the administrative law approach, namely that Congress
has constitutional authority to regulate an activity even at the cost of preempting
or otherwise burdening the states.162  Instead, the focus here, as with process
federalism, necessarily must be on ensuring that federal officials adequately
consider and justify decisions that harm state interests, not that they forego such
decisions altogether.  
How well, then, does administrative law function in ensuring 
consideration of state interests in playing a regulatory role and being free of
federal regulatory impositions?  The record from the federalism-administrative
law quintet is mixed, but offers some basis for optimism.  Oregon is clearest in
cautioning agencies that they must give due heed to the regulatory role played by
states in federal statutes.  Massachusetts, in turn, grants states an important role in
challenging federal policy.  Although the Court ruled against the state in ADEC
and Watters, those decisions also preserve important openings for state regulation. 
ADEC emphasized the broad discretion states exercises over granting permits,
while Watters technically only precluded state enforcement and oversight efforts,
leaving the states free to impose substantive requirements on national banks
provided those are not seen as significant obstacles to national bank operations. 
On the other hand, Watters’ willingness to read the NBA as broadly preempting,
as well as its failure to force the OCC to offer greater explanation and justification
for preempting state oversight, are less encouraging.  Most concerning is the
overall lack of express reference to how state interests should factor into agency
decisionmaking and judicial review of administrative action.
A fuller picture emerges from taking a step back from these decisions and
assessing administrative law’s adequacy as a federalism surrogate from a more
abstract perspective.  Reasons certainly exist to be skeptical of the extent to which
agencies will protect state regulatory prerogatives, but it is also easy to
underestimate the influence that the states can wield administratively.  Critically,
moreover, administrative agencies and administrative law are not the same thing. 
163 Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 908 (2000); see also Jack W.
Campbell, Regulatory Preemption in the Garcia/Chevron Era, 59 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 805, 832 (1998);
Damien J. Marshall, Note, The Application of Chevron Deference in Regulatory Preemption
Cases, 87 Geo. L. J. 263, 277-78 (1998); Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 315, 331 (2000).  For contrary views, see Mendelson, supra note , at 758; Richard J. Pierce,
Regulation, Deregulation, Federalism, and Administrative Law: Agency Power to Preempt State
Regulations, 46 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 607, 664 (1985).
164 See, e.g., Jerry Mashaw, ProDelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political
Decisions, 1 J. L. Econ. & Org. 91 (1985).  For critique, Jede Nzebile, The Fable of the Nationalist
President and the Parochial Congress, 53 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1217 (2006)
165 See e.g. Louisiana PSC v. FCC Public Serv. Com v. FCC, 476 US. 355 (1986)
(describing agency arguments of the need for uniformity).  Cf Philip J. Weiser, Cooperative
Federalism, Federal Common Law, and The Enforcement of the Telecom Act, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
1692 (2001).
166 Hills, Against Preemption, supra note _ , at __ (describing pol economy of preemption
battles).  But see Matthew C. Stephenson , Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: The Case
for Expanding the Role of Administrative Agencies, 91 Va. l. Rev. 93, 130-32 (2005) (arguing
agency capture fears are often exaggerated).
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Administrative law involves deference to agency decisionmaking, to be sure, but
it encompasses significantly more than that, in particular procedural limits on
agencies and independent judicial scrutiny in some contexts.  As a result,
administrative law represents an important mechanism for improving federal
agencies’ responsiveness to state interests.
1.  Political versus Alternative Safeguards.  Commentators on
administrative preemption have identified several reasons for skepticism about
the extent to which agencies can adequately protect a regulatory role for the
states.  First among these is the claimed lack of political safeguards for federalism
in the administrative context.  Justice Stevens put it, “[u]nlike Congress,
administrative agencies are clearly not designed to represent the interests of
States.”163  Moreover, although presidential oversight may render agencies
politically accountable to some degree, it does not clearly tie them to state
interests.  On the contrary, the President is often identified as representing
national interests against the more parochial views of members of Congress.164 
That nationalist focus may make agencies more inclined to value regulatory
uniformity over state variation and more likely to heed the cries of national
industrial groups bemoaning the burdens of state regulation.165  At a minimum,
federal agencies are likely to be subject to substantial lobbying from regulated
entities favoring preemption, undermining state influence and heightening fears of
agency capture.166  Also playing a role here is that the hierarchical aspect of
167 On the importance of such multiple power bases in Congress, see Carol F. Lee, The
Political Safeguards of Federalism?  Congressional Responses to Supreme Court Decisions on
State and Local Liability, 20 Urb. Law. 301 (1988)
168 See Kramer, supra note _, at __; Mendelson, supra note _, at 768–69.
169 See DAVID B. WALKER, THE REBIRTH OF FEDERALISM: SLOUCHING TOWARD
WASHINGTON 129-70 (1995) (providing an overview of changes in federal-state relations from
1960 through early 1990s); Barry Rabe, Environmental Policy and the Bush Era: The Collision
Between the Administrative Presidency and State Experimentation, 37 Publius 413, 415–18, 420-
22 (2007) (detailing changed federal-state relationships in the environmental arena under the Bush
I, Clinton, and Bush II administrations); Denise Scheberle, The Evolving Matrix of Environmental
Federalism and Intergovernmental Relationships, 35 Publius 69, 75, 77–84 (2005) (describing
changed managerial approaches in federal environmental programs during the 1990s that delegated
greater managerial control to implementing states); Michael J. Scicchitano & David M. Hedge,
From Coercion to Partnership in Federal Partial Preemption: SMCRA, RCRA, and the OSH Act,
23 Publius 107, 109 (1993) (noting that initial implementation of several federal environmental
and health statutes was largely coercive towards the states but changed by the mid-late 1990s, with
the federal and state governments coming to share responsibility over implementation).
170 See John Kincaid, From Cooperative to Coercive Federalism, 509 Annals of the AM.
Acad. of Pol. & Soc. Sci. 139 (1990); Paul Posner, The Politics of Coercive Federalism in the
Bush Era, 37 Publius 390, 390–92, 400 (2007). But see Tim Conlan, From Cooperative to
Opportunistic Federalism: Reflections on the Half-Century Anniversary of the Commission on
Intergovernmental Relations, 66 Pub. Admin. Rev. 663, 666-68 (2006) (arguing that the current
federal-state system is more opportunistic than coercive or cooperative because “actors . . . pursue
their immediate interests with little regard for the institutional or collective consequences”); Joseph
F. Zimmerman, Congressional Preemption During the George W. Bush Administration, 37 Publius
432, 446–47 (2007) (arguing that federal-state relationships demonstrate continuous
metamorphosis and are more complex and nuanced than descriptions such as “coercive” or
“cooperative” convey).
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agencies may serve to restrict states’ access, particularly compared to Congress
which offers affected states multiple points of entry.167
Clearly, concerns about the states’ loss of influence in the executive
branch have some merit.  But it is also easy to exaggerate the extent of this loss. 
Numerous factors, such as congressional oversight, federal officials’ ties to state
regulators, lobbying by state political organizations, and dependence on state
implementation, can all serve to give state regulatory interests leverage in federal
agency decisionmaking.168  The influence states wield by virtue of their role in
federal regulatory programs merits particular note.  Studies of joint federal-state
regulatory programs indicate that the extent of state power in these contexts has
varied over the years, reflecting changes in political climate, regulatory
approaches, and perceptions of state regulatory competence.169  These studies also
document a trend towards more coercive federal-state relationships since the
1960s, with states increasingly facing mandates and federal preemption.170 
Nonetheless, responsibility for program implementation and enforcement appears
171 See Robert Agranoff, Managing within the Matrix: Do Collaborative
Intergovernmental Relations Exist?  31 Publius 31, 45–54 (2001); Scheberle, Evolving Matrix,
supra note , at 75–76; Scicchitano & Hedge, supra note _ ; Weiser, Cooperative Federalism, supra
note , at 1738–41 (describing influence and role of states under the 1996 Telecom Act). 
172 DENISE SCHEBERLE, FEDERALISM AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: TRUST AND THE
POLITICS OF IMPLEMENTATION 159–80,182–83, 188 (1997).
173 State and federal regulators’ shared policy goals and professional expertise may also
work to defend a state regulatory role, but the impact of these ties is more contentious.  In
particular, Professor Rick Hills has argued that substantive policy ties between state and federal
administrators may mean that state administrators will put substantive federal policy goals with
which they agree above state institutional interests in preserving a regulatory role.  See Roderick
M. Hills, The Eleventh Amendment as Curb on Bureaucratic Power, 53 Stan. L. Rev. 1225,
1236–37 (2001).  But the same should hold true of federal administrative officials: when state
regulation may offer substantive policy benefits, federal officials should seek to protect state
regulatory authority.   In this vein, Nina Mendelson has argued that federal agency officials may
be particularly likely to appreciate the national benefits that can accrue from state regulatory
autonomy, for example in the way that one state’s experimentation can yield new regulatory
solutions which other states and the national government can then pursue. See Mendelson, supra
note , at 767-68.  See Scheberle.  In the end, it seems likely that whether substantive and personal
ties between federal and state administrative officials serves to protect state regularly authority or
instead undermine it will vary according to the specific program and issue involved.  This is not to
deny, as a number of commentators have argued, that “close cooperation among experts at the
state and federal level . . . undermines the power of elected officials at both levels,”  Larry Kramer,
Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of federalism, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 215, 283
n. 269 (2000), but rather to question whether policy and professional ties necessarily work to the
benefits of federal bureaucrats over state bureaucrats.
174 See 5 U.S.C. § 553. 
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to enhance state influence over federal agency decisionmaking.171  Agency
structure also appears relevant, with regional offices offering an opportunity for
developing closer state-federal relationships and sensitivity to state interests.172 
Such close relationships may create internal agency support for paying attention
to state needs that could counterbalance the states’ loss of external access to
federal decisionmakers as a result of the shift of policysetting to the agency
context and away from Congress.173
2.  Administrative Law’s Procedural and Substantive Requirements. 
Perhaps most important, administrative law offers additional safeguards on
agency functioning that could work to the states’ advantage, aside from these
internal administrative pressures.  These are the restrictions imposed on agency
action, in particular the opportunities for state notification and participation
created by notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures and amplified by
substantive requirements of agency explanation and reasoned decisionmaking.174  
From a political perspective, notice-and-comment rulemaking offers a means by
which states can learn of pending agency action that might harm their interests
175  Positive political theory views administrative procedure as a means of assisting
congressional oversight and protecting against bureaucratic drift.  See McNollgast, Structure and
Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the political Control of Agencies,
75 Va. L. Rev. 431, 440-44 (1989); McNollgast, Administrative Procedures as Instruments of
Political Control, 3 J. L. Econ & Org. 243, 257-60 (1987); Bressman, Procedures as Politics, supra
note , at 15-22 (describing positive political theory and noting some criticisms of its account).
176 See supra note __.
177 See Mendelson, supra note , at 777-78; Paul McGreal,  Some Rice with Your
Chevron?  Presumption and Deference in Regulatory Preemption, 45 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 823,
874 (1995).
178 See Nagareda, supra note , at 45–46; see also commentary supportive of Mead for this
reason (Bressman, etc).
179See supra TAN __ (II.A.1).
180 Agencies are required to assess and justify impact on the states under Executive Order
13132, but the Executive Order is not itself judicially enforceable.
181 Weiser, supra note _; see also Buzbee, supra note, at __. 
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and inform their political allies in Congress.175  Especially interesting here is
Congress’s inclusion in several statutes of notice-and-comment rulemaking or its
equivalent as a prerequisite before an agency can displace a state regulatory
role.176  This suggests that, at a minimum, members of Congress—or state groups
lobbying Congress—consider such procedures to offer some protection against
encroachments on state regulatory authority.  From a more legal and agency-
functioning viewpoint, notice-and-comment rulemaking offers a means of
ensuring agencies are informed of and respond to state concerns.177  The relative
formality and centralized aspect of notice-and-comment rulemaking also helps
ensure that agency determinations are made after considerable deliberation and
review.178
Substantive requirements governing the quality of agency decisionmaking
reinforce this last feature.  Agencies must respond to significant comments not
simply to fulfill the APA’s procedural demands, but also to avoid their
determinations being found to be arbitrary and capricious.  The result is to impose
potentially substantial obligations of explanation on agencies.179  The states’
constitutional significance might be thought alone sufficient to require that
agencies consider and justify the impact a proposed regulation will have on the
states’ regulatory role.180  But at a minimum, statutory stipulations of a regulatory
role for the states—for instance, in cooperative regulatory schemes or savings
clauses limiting preemption—provide a basis to require that agencies take
seriously the impact a proposed regulation will have on the states.181  Finally,
these procedural and substantive requirements may create incentives for an
182 Mendelson, supra note _, at 758-59.
183 See id.  Moreover, useful quantifiable data may be hard to produce, given that some
quantifiable measures, such as agency responses to state comments in the preambles of final rules,
id at 776 n.164, may be prone to agency manipulation.  As a result, detailed case studies of states’
influence on particular regulatory initiatives might prove the most profitable. 
184 [UPDATE, see NW piece] See Mendelson, supra note , at 783–85 (sampling 600
proposed or final rulemakings in a three month period and finding only for which agencies
prepared six federalism impact statements, with none of these acknowledging the value of
preserving state regulatory prerogatives); U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Federalism:
Implementation of Executive Order 12612 in the Rulemaking Process (reporting that only five
federalism impact statements were prepared in conjunction with issuance of 11,000 final rules
between April 1996 and December 1998.  See also 64 Fed. Reg. 43,255 (Aug. 4, 1999).
185 § 11, 64 Fed. Reg. 43255, 43259.
51
agency to consult with states early on, before the agency has promulgated a
proposed rule and at a time when it may be most receptive to alternatives. 
As Professor Nina Mendelson has argued, the ability of states to protect
their regulatory interests through notice-and-comment rulemaking is largely an
empirical question, as are claims about the extent of state influence on federal
agency decisionmaking.182  Although public administration scholarship offers
studies of many aspects of federal-state relationships, surprising little empirical
evidence exists on federal-state interactions in rulemaking and other procedural
contexts of particular relevance to administrative law.183  Studies do exist
documenting federal agencies’ failure to take seriously the federalism assessment
obligations imposed by Executive Order 13132, which suggests that notice-and-
comment rulemaking may not actually yield significant federalism benefits.184  On
the other hand, the Executive Order expressly states that it is “not intended to
create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law,”185
which makes it a poor basis on which to draw conclusions about the federalism
impact of judicially-enforceable requirements.
3.  The Scope of Agency Expertise and the Role of Politics.   Public choice
and institutional competency arguments are also raised against federal agencies’
ability to serve as reliable representatives for state regulatory interests.  One such
argument is that federal agencies are primarily interested in expanding their own
policymaking power and achieving their programmatic goals, which sets them in
conflict with state regulatory autonomy.  Another maintains that federal agencies’
specific programmatic focus makes them ill-equipped to consider general issues
186 See Br. of the Ctr for State Enforcement, supra note , at 13-14; Marshall, supra note, at
280-81; Mendelson, supra note , at 794-97.
187 See Br. of the Ctr for State Enforcement, supra note , at 11-12; Mendelson, supra note ,
at 779-91, see also id. at 793-94 (arguing that allowing agencies to consider general federalism
concerns untethered to a particular statutory scheme raises a danger of unconstrained and thus
potentially arbitrary agency decisionmaking).
188 See, e.g., Mendelson, supra note , at  __; William A. Niskanen, Jr., Bureaucracy and
Representative Government 36-42 (1971); Stephen G. Breyer, Regulation and Risk Breaking the
Vicious Circle: Toward Effective Risk Regulation (1993).
189 See, e.g., Wilmarth, supra note __, at __  (providing evidence supporting the claim that
recent OCC preemption efforts were affected by the OCC’s desire to expand the number of banks
with national bank charters and thereby expand the fees the OCC collects); Louisiana PSC Public
Serv. Com v. FCC, 476 US. 355 (1986).  
190 For description of these proposals, see supra note __; Sharkey, Preamble, supra note
__, at __.  For discussion of such arguments generally, see Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building
Government in Constitutional Law, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 915, 942 (2005).
191 See  Jerry L. Mashaw, Greed, Chaos, and Governance __ (1997); Steven P. Croley,
Public Interested Regulation, 28 Fla. St. U. Ll Rev. 7, __(2000); David B. Spence & Frank Cross,
A Public Choice Case for the Administrative State, 89 Geo. L. J. 97, 121–23 (2000); Stephenson,
supra note , at __. 
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of the appropriate federal-state balance.186  If nothing else, some scholars contend
that agencies lack expertise on such questions of general government structure.187  
Again, these arguments have some intuitive power.  It is hard to dispute
the risk that federal agencies will privilege specific programmatic goals over
more general concerns relating to government structure—administrative tunnel
vision is hardly an unknown phenomenon.188  It is similarly plausible to conclude
that at least in some contexts federal agencies view state regulators as competitors
and seek to use preemption to advance their institutional interests.189  The recent
spate of aggressive preemption efforts by numerous different agencies during the
Bush Administration—the OCC, FDA, Consumer Product Safety Administration,
the National Highway Safety Administration, and the Federal Railroad
Administration—raises real concerns about the potential for federal bureaucratic
empire-building at the expense of the states.190 
Yet public choice accounts of agency motivation are unduly simplistic, to
the extent they portray federal agency officials as motivated solely by desire for
greater resources and power and without consideration of what represents the best
regulatory policy.191  It also is mistaken to think that agency self-interest always
lies on the side of expanding federal regulatory power at the expense of the states. 
Even in public choice terms that account rings false, as the potential of
congressional retaliation or the desire to avoid new responsibilities may lead
rational agency officials to a different account of where their parochial interests
192 Levinson, supra note __ at 923-37.  Mendelson, supra note _ at 796; Quincy Crawford,
Comment, Chevron Deference to Agency Interpretations that Delimit the Scope of the Agency’s
Jurisdiction, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 957, 982 (1994).  Indeed, agencies have at times fought expanded
responsibilities for fear they won’t perform well.  (Martha Derthick, Policymaking for Social
Security (1979).
193  See, e.g., Gersen, supra note , at 32; Michael S. Greve & Jonathan Klick, Preemption
in the Rehnquist Court: A Preliminary Empirical Account, 2006 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 43, 73 (noting
that during the Rehnquist Court, the Solicitor General only took “a pro-preemption position in 39
of 95 preemption cases, or about 40 percent”); Sharkey, PLP, supra note _, at 235–36; Lars Noah,
53 U. Kan. L. Rev. 149 (2004).
194 See National Assn. of Homebuilders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 127 S. Ct. 2518 (2007);
Freeman & Vermeule, supra note _ , (noting the Bush Administration’s opposition to ESA).
195  Opponents of these regulatory measures certainly see them in terms of the
Administration’s general support for limits on tort actions.  See, e.g., Stephen Labaton, ‘Silent Tort
Reform’ Is Overriding States’ Powers, N.Y. Times, Mar. 10, 2006, at C5; William Funk et al., The
Truth About Torts; Using Agency Preemption to Undercut Consumer Health and Safety, Ctr. For
Prog. Reform White Paper, Sept. 2007.  The White House, not surprisingly, denies the charge that
these preemption proposals “reflect a concerted administrative policy.” Caroline E. Mayer, Rules
Would Limit Lawsuits: U.S. Agencies Seek to Preempt States, Wash. Post., Feb. 16, 2006 at D01. 
It is worth noting that some of the regulations involve agencies headed by independent
commissions rather than simply agencies led by presidential political appointees, complicating the
claim that they represent a Bush Administration initiative.  On the other hand, the use of
preemption appeared to grow significantly since 2006, a time by which President Bush would have
been able to significantly effect the membership of most independent agencies, and independent
agencies are often quite responsive to presidential policy preferences. [Peter M. Shane,
Independent Policymaking and Presidential Power, 57 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 596 (1989); Peter L.
Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government, 84 Coum. L. Rev. 573, 590–95 (1984).]
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lie.192  Too many instances exist of federal agencies refusing to preempt or
seeking to expand state regulatory autonomy to conclude that federal agencies are
categorically insensitive or hostile to preserving a state regulatory role.193  This is
not to deny that federal agencies are able to aggrandize themselves at the expense
of the states were they so inclined.  But the fact that federal agencies frequently
are not so inclined underscores that the explanation for federal agency behavior is
more complicated.  
One crucial variable the public choice account omits is politics.  An
agency’s political agenda is likely to affect whether the agency will seek to
accord states a regulatory role or instead centralize control in Washington.  Thus,
EPA’s determination that the Endangered Species Act had no limiting effect on
its duty to transfer permitting authority to a qualified state under the CWA,
upheld last term by the Court, no doubt reflected in part the Bush
Administration’s hostility to the former statute.194  Similarly, recent efforts to
preempt state tort actions are in line with the Administration’s support for tort
reform and restrictions.195  Put simply, politics rather than institutional position is
likely the driving force behind federal administrative limitations on the
196 On politics dominating over federalism principles in Congress, see, e.g., Conlan, supra
note _, at __ GET PIN Walker, supra note _, at __ GET PIN; Hills, Against Preemption, supra note
_, at 36.  On politics dominating over federalism principles in courts, see Frank B. Cross &
Emerson H. Tiller, The Three Faces of Federalism; An Empirical Assessment of Supreme Court
Federalism Jurisprudence, 73 S. Cal. L. Rev. 741, 768 (2000) (concluding that data demonstrates
“a significant ideological component of federalism decisionmaking,” although noting that “honest
federalism” could also be playing a strong role); Richard Fallon, The “Conservative” Paths of the
Rehnquist Court’s Federalism Decisions, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 429, __ (2001). 
197 This seems to me equally true of preemption decisions; all that seems needed to
translate a preemption question into a clear policy choice is consideration of whether state
regulation is an obstacle to achieving federal regulatory goals.  See also Brief for Administrative
Law Professors, supra note _ Watters (preemption is a policy choice). 
198 Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption (PLP), supra note , draft at 25-26; see also
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 506 (1996) (Breyer, J. concurring) (arguing that agency
responsibility for administering a statute “means informed agency involvement and, therefore,
special understanding of the likely impact of both state and federal requirements, as well as an
understanding of whether (or the extent to which) state requirements may interfere with federal
objectives”).  While this may be particularly true in regard to cooperative regulatory schemes,
which by their nature entail substantial interaction between the two levels of government, it is also
true even when federal and state regulation is largely independent   See Pierce, supra note , at 664;
Gersen, supra note, at 32; Sharkey, PLP, at 25–26 (federal expertise on regulatory impact of state
tort law).
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states—and in that regard agencies appear little different from Congress or even
the courts.196
This leaves the claim that agencies simply lack expertise in determining
the proper balance between federal and state regulation.  Here, much turns on how
the question of expertise is framed.  Agencies have no special claim to expertise
in assessing the proper federal-state balance in the abstract, divorced from a
particular regulatory scheme or statute.  But federalism disputes are unlikely to
surface in such a form—whether before agencies, the federal courts, or Congress. 
Instead, as the federalism-administrative law quintet suggests, these questions
arise in particular regulatory contexts.  In such contexts questions about the
appropriate state-federal balance are not easily divorced from substantive policy
determinations on which agencies clearly do have expertise.197  ADEC is
illustrative:  The strength and legitimacy of the state dignity concerns asserted
there cannot be separated from an assessment of the importance of EPA oversight
of state BACT determinations to achieving the CAA’s goals, a question on which
EPA has the greatest expertise. 
Furthermore, framed in terms of specific contexts, agencies likely will
have expertise on how best to balance federal-state regulatory roles.  As Catherine
Sharkey has written, “[w]ith respect to answering the central preemption
question—namely, whether there in fact should be a uniform federal regulatory
policy—federal agencies emerge as the institutional actor best able to answer.”198 
For example, the OCC would seem to have relevant expertise in assessing
199 Even in such contexts of rival regulation, however, federal insensitivity to state
regulatory authority cannot be presumed.  State regulation may in fact serve federal interests, for
example by allowing federal regulators to redirect their oversight activities or save on enforcement
costs.   Whether federal administrators can benefit from state efforts depends, of course, on
whether the regulatory policy and goals of federal and state governments are similar—but
conflicting policies would seem to be fair (as in jurisdictionally-neutral) grounds for federal
officials to be concerned about state actions.  And even when policy conflict exists, other factors,
such as congressional oversight or political ramifications more generally, may ensure that federal
agencies accommodate state concerns.
200 See, e.g., C&W Fish, Co., Inc. v. 931 F.2d 1556 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
201 See generally Neil K. Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives: Choosing Institutions in Law,
Economics, and Public Policy (1994) (emphasizing the need to assess institutional competence in
comparative perspective).
202 See Mendelson, supra note, at 759–69 (arguing that Congress’s regional structure
gives it “no special advantage in considering . . . more ‘national’ federalism benefits” and that “it
is unclear why members of Congress would have any special incentive (beyond their incentive to
respond to officials of their particular state) to respond to the . . .views” of state organizations like
the National Governors’ Association); see also Note, New Evidence of the Presumption Against
Preemption: An Empirical Study of Congressional Responses to Supreme Court Preemption
Decisions, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 1604, 1605 (2007) (noting that “Congress almost never responds to
the Court’s preemption decisions”).
203 See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001), Mistretta v. U.S. 488 U.S.
361 (1989).  The fact that in none of the federalism-administrative law quintet of decisions did the
Court expressly rely on devices such as clear statement rules or the presumption against
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whether state oversight of national bank subsidiaries will significantly impede the
ability of national banks to operate and the extent to which federal preemption of
such oversight will undermine the nation’s dual banking system.  
The problem, in short, is not lack of expertise, but federal administrative
overprotectiveness of federal regulatory prerogatives—federal bias, if you will.199 
Administrative law cases make clear that distinguishing between bias and
expertise is hard,200 but that challenge cannot legitimately be avoided simply by
denying expertise exists.
Equally important is the comparative point alluded to above.  The question
is not whether federal agencies will take concerns with preserving a state
regulatory role into account, but whether they will do so to a greater or lesser
degree than the alternatives of Congress or the federal courts.201  As Mendelson
argues, it is not clear that Congress offers significantly more sensitivity to state
regulatory prerogatives than federal agencies.202   In any event, insisting that
Congress itself resolve all federal-state questions is a nonstarter.  Congress simply
lacks the resources and foresight to resolve all the federalism issues that can arise
in a given regulatory scheme.   Requiring it to do so is functionally tantamount to
killing a regulatory program, something the Court’s delegation cases make clear it
is not prepared to do.203    
preemption reinforces this point, as these devices might be thought of as means to ensure that
Congress itself resolve federalism disputes.  See William N. Eskridge Jr. & Philip P. Frickey,
Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules As Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 Vand. L. Rev.
593, 619–29, 631 (1992); Mendelson, supra note __, at 759 (arguing that the presumption against
preemption could be seen “as a method of ensuring that Congress itself makes the preemption
decision”); see also supra Part II.B.
204 See Sharkey, Preamble, supra note at 251–52.
205 Mendelson, supra note , at 787-88; Eskridge & Frickey, supra note _ 
206 Weiser, discussions of Swift, Sharkey & Issacharoff; Gersen, supra note ,  at 32
(noting Attorney General Reno’s refusal to preempt Oregon’s Death with Dignity statute and
concluding “there is little in [Oregon] to suggest a uniform bias in favor of preemption and against
the preservation of state authority.”)
207 See Daniel J. Meltzer, The Supreme Court’s Judicial Passivity, 2002 Sup. Ct. Rev.
343, 367–69, 376; Fallon, supra note _, at 462 (noting lack of consistent state prerogative thread in
Rehnquist Court decisions and concluding driving force was instead conservatism); Ruth Coelker
& Kevin M. Scott, Dissing States?: Invalidation Of State Action During The Rehnquist Era, 88
Va. L. Rev. 1301 (2002); see also Young, Two Federalisms, supra note , at __ (Rehnquist Court
emphasizes formal sovereignty over substantive power). 
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As a result, the comparison needs to be between federal agencies and
federal courts as much as between federal agencies and Congress; given that
Congress will delegate broadly, one of these institutions will need to resolve the
federalism disputes that will inevitably arise.204   A case could be made that the
courts have a comparative advantage over agencies in resolving federalism
questions.  Unlike specialized, program-focused agencies, the federal courts are
generalist institutions that have special responsibilities to enforce constitutional
structures and values.205  Yet in practice, it is not at all clear that the federal courts
have been more sensitive to state regulatory interests than agencies, and at times
they have been strong enforcers of federal uniformity over state control.206  More
recently, several commentators have noted the Rehnquist Court’s willingness to
curtail state regulatory authority in a variety of contexts.207  The difficulty in
separating substantive policy and federalism also undermines the institutional
competency arguments in favor of courts, for courts are comparatively ill-
equipped to assess the substantive impact that preserving a state role may have on
a particular regulatory regime.  
4.  The Capaciousness of Administrative Law.  Here, one of the
advantages of focusing on administrative law as a federalism surrogate rather than
administrative agencies rises to the fore.  Administrative law is institutionally
capacious; it includes rules that govern internal agency actions as well as external
review of agency actions by courts.  (Indeed, administrative law in some ways
even encompasses Congress, as it addresses Congress’s constitutional ability to
design agencies and control their decisionmaking and also contains elaborate
doctrines of statutory interpretation.)  Administrative law is also doctrinally
208 These complaints are raised, for example, in commentary on Chevron and ossification
of rulemaking. The former tends to stress the danger that judges will as a result impose their own
preferred policies in lieu of the agencies, thereby undermining political accountability and
principled decisionmaking.  See ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN
INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION __(2006); Cross, supra note _, at __; see also
Miles & Sunstein, supra note __, at __; Merrill, Mead, supra note __, at __ (arguing for a clearer
rule-based approach to determining when Chevron applies).  The latter tends to focus on the
harmful effects potentially broad-ranging judicial review has on agency functioning, such as
requiring agencies to devote substantially greater resources to rulemaking or forego it altogether,
as well as how judges’ lack of substantive knowledge and expertise undermines their ability to
review agency action intelligently.  See Pierce, 7 Ways to Deossify, supra note _, at __; Cross,
supra note _, at __; McGarrity, Ossification, supra note __, at __. 
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capacious, and in particular includes prescriptions for both deference and
searching scrutiny.  Courts need not step outside existing doctrinal frameworks to
rein in agencies perceived to be overreaching or insufficiently sensitive to
significant state interests.  Express invocation of state interests is also easily
included within an administrative law framework, as a presumptively relevant
factor that agencies must consider in their decisionmaking. 
This capaciousness allows administrative law to draw on the federalism-
reinforcing aspects of both agencies and courts.  For example, by independently
scrutinizing the scope of power Congress has delegated to an agency, courts can
guard against agency overreaching.  Yet requirements that courts defer to
administrative determinations within this range of delegated authority allow room
for agencies to exercise some discretion on federalism matters.   Administrative
law also offers the possibility of seeking to advance federalism interests by
enforcing procedural controls on agencies, rather than relying wholly on judicial
review of agency decisionmaking by courts or Congress.  Moreover, by forcing
an agency to provide notice of actions it plans to take, procedural requirements
also empower congressional oversight and thus reinforces such political
safeguards as Congress has to offer. 
Extolling administrative law’s capaciousness as a federalism virtue is
more than a little ironic.  It is precisely this capaciousness—the fact that
administrative law contains within in a number of alternative doctrinal moves
from which courts can choose—that many administrative law scholars identify as
its fundamental flaw.  Their complaint is that this breadth translates into
essentially unconstrained power in reviewing courts.208  That complaint is very
relevant here, since it suggests that in practice administrative law is not that
institutionally capacious at all; in the end, the courts call the shots across-the
board.  Moreover, some might contest the claim that administrative law is
capacious even if courts do succeed (at least sometimes) in combining
independent scrutiny with deferential review.   The problem is that on any given
issue one institution—court or agency—will dominate.   Options exist to try and
avoid a strict demarcation between judicial and administrative decisionmaking,
for example a more sliding scale, Skidmore-esque approach to reviewing agency
209 See United States v. Mead (Scalia, J., dissenting); Vermeule, Judging Under
Uncertainty, at __; Merrill, Mead, supra note _, at __. 
210 For better, see, e.g., William F. Pedersen, Formal Records and Informal Rulemaking,
85 Yale L. J. 38, 59-60 (1975); Seidenfeld, supra note _.  For worse, see Mashaw & Harbst, supra
note _, at __; Pierce, supra note _, at ; see also Melnick, supra note __, at __ (on ossification,
dominance of lawyers over substantive experts in agencies). 
211 O’Connell, supra note , at __ at n69, Miles & Sunstein, supra note , at __ (discussing
data indicating that political composition of an appeals panel can have an effect on results); Peter
L. Strauss, Overseer or Decider, Yale L J/Chi L Rev forthcoming. Peter Schuck & Donald Elliot,
Studying Administrative Law: A Methodology For, and Report on, New Empirical Research, 42
Administrative Law Review 519 (1990); see also Pauline Kim, NYU l Rev Pauline Kim, Lower
Court Discretion, 82 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 383 (2007) (limits of attitudinal model to understand judicial
behavior).
212 See Michael S. Greve & Jonathan Klick, Preemption in the Rehnquist Court: A
Preliminary Empirical Account, 14 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 43, 57, 73-74 (noting that the probability
of “an anti-preemption outcome is highly likely when the [Solicitor General] argues against
preemption,” although “preemption litigation in the Supreme Court [was] by and large a fifty-fifty
proposition” during the period); see also David B. Spence & Paula Murray, The Law, Economics,
and Politics of Federal Preemption Jurisprudence: A Quantitative Analysis, 87 Cal. L. Rev. 1127,
1177–78 (1999) (noting that although federal agencies rarely took a position on preemption
challenges before the federal appeals courts, “[w]hen they did . . . they appeared to have swayed
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determinations on federalism issues.  But adopting such an approach is likely to
worsen the danger of judicial dominance.209
Despite these objections, administrative law’s breadth still seems to offer
a potential federalism payoff.  Much scholarship has identified the ways that
judicial review—for better or worse—indirectly influences how agencies
operate,210 and even if Chevron is only softly constraining, it nonetheless may
lead judges to defer to agency policy choices with which they disagree.211  Even
limited impacts of these sorts suffice to conclude that some potential exists to
harness the potential federalism-reinforcing aspects of both courts and agencies
through administrative law.  
Perhaps more importantly, that judges can manipulate administrative law
doctrine seems unlikely to work significantly against the regulatory interests of
the states, even if it does not accrue to their favor.  Consider in this regard the
Court’s recent decision in Watters.  Chevron’s malleability, specifically the
potential expansiveness of the step one inquiry, is clearly on display.  But it is
harder to imagine the Court reading the statutory mandate so expansively had the
OCC ruled against preemption.   Indeed, in none of the five decisions did the
Court use its independent judgment to undermine state regulatory interests in the
face of state-supportive agency action.  Empirical studies of preemption offer
further support.  Notably, the federal government’s opposition to preemption, in
the form of a brief from the Solicitor General arguing against preemption,
significantly reduces the likelihood that the Court will find preemption.212
the courts.”); Sharkey, PLP, supra note _draft at 14.
213 See, e.g., Bressman, NYU L Rev (arbitrariness review and due process). 
214 I characterize administrative law as subconstitutional rather than nonconstitutional
because the basic federal administrative procedure statutes like the APA or FOIA represent “super-
statutes” whose repeal is nearly impossible.  See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-
Statutes, 50 Duke L. J. 1215, __ (2001).  But see Edward Rubin, It’s Time to Make the
Administrative Procedure Act Administrative, 89 Cornell L. Rev. 95, 108 (2003) (arguing for an
overhauling of the APA).
215 See Bressman, NYU L Rev, supra note at __; Sunstein, supra note at __; Eskridge &
Frickey, supra note _, at __.
216 546 U.S. 243, 255 (2006).
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Viewed more theoretically, if assertions of the federal courts’ greater
institutional competency and sensitivity on federalism matters are true, then the
courts’ ability to manipulate deference doctrines should operate in federalism’s
favor.   The real danger is that these assertions may not be true, and that, on the
contrary, states interests would be best advanced by more thoroughgoing judicial
deference to agency decisionmaking.  If so, however, that would merely
underscore the importance of the administrative component of administrative law,
rather than call the possibility of administrative law serving as a federalism
surrogate into question.
5.  The Normalizing Function of Administrative Law.   A final advantage
of administrative law as a federalism surrogate is its subconstitutional and generic
character.  Many administrative law doctrines reflect constitutional values and
concerns, such as fears of unchecked and irrational exercises of coercive power.213 
Nonetheless, most of these doctrines are recognized to be subconstitutional in
scope—and as a result, subject to alteration by Congress.214  Moreover, rejection
of an agency decision, at least on arbitrary and capricious or procedural grounds,
does not serve to take power to decide the issue at hand away from an agency. 
Instead, the result is remand to the agency for further consideration.  As a result,
courts may prove more willing to enforce federalism values through an
administrative law lens, when doing so does not erect a permanent barrier to
federal action.215  The generic, or non-federalism specific, nature of ordinary
administrative law may reinforce this willingness because it allows courts to
bypass issues about the legitimacy of limiting federal agency action on federalism
grounds.   Like the Oregon majority, they can instead claim to be motivated by
“familiar principles” that are not tied to the subject of federal-state relations.216
This subconstitutional and generic character makes administrative law
also particularly well-suited for addressing the central challenge of contemporary
federalism:  ensuring and protecting the relevance of states as regulatory entities
in contexts marked by concurrent federal-state authority and an extensive federal
administrative state.  As argued above, under current constitutional doctrines little
217 See, e.g., Gardbaum, supra note _; Young, supra note _;, Hills, Against Preemption, 
supra note _ at 4.
218 The anti-commandeering rule is an example; though it prohibits the federal
government from drafting state officials in the cause of implementing federal programs, se Printz
v. New York, its practical effect is more limited given the ability of the federal government to
make such state implementation a condition of funding.  See Roderick M. Hills, The Political
Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty”
Doesn’t, 96 Mich. L. Rev. 813 (1998).
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private activity falls outside the federal government’s regulatory power and what
does is reachable through federal conditional spending.  Thus if federalism is to
succeed in preserving a regulatory role for the states, it has to come in to play in
contexts of concurrent authority.217  In such contexts, however, direct
constitutional challenges are unlikely to do much work other than at the
margins.218  Combine all this with judicial unwillingness to impede Congress’s
ability to delegate and rely on administrative agencies for policysetting, and it
seems clear that federalism will play a very limited role if kept to the form of a
constitutional or quasi-constitutional trump on federal action.
Instead, for federalism to have continued vibrancy as a governing
principle, it needs to be “normalized” and incorporated into the day-to-day
functioning of the federal administrative state.  Using administrative law to ensure
that federalism concerns are met represents a central mechanism for achieving
this incorporation.  If successful, federalism becomes an everyday consideration,
one that agencies must take seriously and accommodate yet also one they have
authority to override provided they adequately justify the need to do so. 
Federalism loses trumping status, but gains everyday relevancy.  Given
federalism’s limited trumping capacity, this trade-off seems clearly worthwhile.
ENHANCING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW’S EFFECTIVENESS 
AS A FEDERALISM SURROGATE
These arguments for why administrative law could prove a useful means
of advancing federalism concerns also have implications for the Court’s future
jurisprudence.  One central implication is that the Court should apply
administrative law doctrines with an eye to reinforcing agency attentiveness to
state interests.  Another is that addressing federalism concerns through ordinary
administrative law may often prove more effective than devising special
federalism-inspired doctrines.  Perhaps most importantly, the Court must discuss
much more openly how federalism should factor into agency decisionmaking and
judicial review if it intends administrative law to play a federalism surrogacy role. 
A. Reinforcing Agency Attentiveness to State Interests
219 See Freeman & Vermeule, supra note , at 26–31. 
220 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NDRC, 435 U.S. 519, 543 (1978).
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One logical implication of the foregoing analysis is that the Court should
seek to reinforce agency incentives to take state interests seriously.  To some
extent, the federalism-administrative law quintet does this.  For example, 
Massachusetts’ “special solicitude for the states” in standing analysis makes it
more likely that federal agencies will face federal court litigation by states who
disagree with the result of administrative proceedings.  As a result, agencies may
well be more attentive to state interests in the course of administrative
proceedings, whether in the hope of reaching compromises that would allay state
suits or with an eye to judicial review and the need to demonstrate that state
concerns were adequately considered.  In addition, one theme that emerges from
the decisions read as a whole is that the absence of careful agency consideration
of state interests may make searching judicial scrutiny more likely.  To contrast
ADEC and Oregon, limited federal trumping of the states will receive more
deference than wholesale overruling, particularly when the circumstances of
agency decisionmaking signal that ideology and politics rather than expertise
were at work.219  Yet the Court’s failure to make this point explicit limits the
extent to which it is likely to have an impact on agency behavior.  Similarly, the
lack of a developed account of why and how state sovereignty matters to standing
analysis in Massachusetts may undermine that decision’s effect.
In addition to greater discussion of the relationship between federalism
and administrative law, the Court’s jurisprudence to date is most deficient in two
key areas: developing the federalism-reinforcing potential of administrative
procedure; and insisting that agencies better justify and explain decisions and
policies that intrude significantly on state regulatory endeavors.
1.  Federalism and Administrative Procedure.  As mentioned, although
procedures surface in several decisions, their role in the Court’s analysis is never
clearly identified.  This omission is particularly unfortunate, given that
administrative procedure may offer important protection for state interests—by
ensuring that states have notice of proposed administrative actions that may harm
their interests and can seek to forestall them, either by dissuading agency officials
or perhaps by alerting Congress and obtaining legislative intervention.  Greater
empirical evidence that administrative procedure in fact serves this role would be
desirable.  But if it does, one option for strengthening administrative law’s role as
a federalism surrogate would be to enhance procedural protections accorded
states.  
A move by the courts to impose new procedural obligations on their own
initiative would encounter significant doctrinal obstacles, in the form of Vermont
Yankee’s instruction that “[a]bsent constitutional constraints or extremely
compelling circumstances, ‘administrative agencies should be free to craft their
own rules of procedure.’”220 Yet Vermont Yankee’s prohibition on new judicial
221 See Metzger, The Story of Vermont Yankee, in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW STORIES
124 (Peter L. Strauss ed., 2006).
222  See Matthew C. Stephenson, The Strategic Substitution Effect: Textual Plausibility,
Procedural Formality, and Judicial Review of Agency Statutory Interpretation, 120 Harv. L. Rev.
528 (2007); Sharkey, Preamble, at 256–57 (recommending imposition of consultation and notice-
and-comment requirements in administrative preemption contexts). 
223 See EO 13132; EO 12988.  Arguably, this would have offered yet another basis for
invalidating the interpretive rule in Oregon, given the significant legal effects—loss of license or
criminal punishment—the rule imposed on doctors who used controlled substances to assist
suicide, and practical nullification of Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act that would result.  For
discussion of the difficulties courts currently have in distinguishing between legislative rules that
require use of notice-and-comment procedures and nonlegislative rules (interpretive rules, policy
statements, or ) that do not, see John Manning, Legislative and Nonlegislative Rules, Geo Wash L
Rev __; Peter L. Strauss et al., eds. Gellhorn & Byse’s Administrative Law: Cases and Materials,
rev. 10th ed. __ (Supp 2007).  
224 Such an approach could have led to a different result in Watters, had the Court relied
on the OCC rule imposing preemption, given the limited and elliptical discussion the rule
contained.  The OCC rule stated simply that preemption would exist to the same extent as under
the NBA, rather than directly stating that state oversight would actually be preempted; moreover,
as the Court noted, only measures that significantly “” ... are preempted.  In addition, the OCC
justified the rule solely by reference to judicial preemption doctrine, rather than by explaining why
exclusive federal oversight was needed to achieve the NBA’s goals. 
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procedural impositions leaves courts free to enforce the procedural requirements
currently contained in statutes and agency rules, an escape hatch courts have
exploited by crafting expansive interpretations of the procedural mandates
contained in the Administrative Procedure Act.221  Such a route seems equally
available here, as courts could reinforce administrative law’s surrogacy power
through vigorous enforcement of the APA’s requirements for notice-and-
comment rulemaking and other statutory procedural requirements.  For example,
courts could relax their substantive scrutiny when agencies utilized procedures
(whether notice and comment rulemaking or other measures) intended to ensure
adequate attention to state’s interests, thereby creating incentives for agencies to
impose such procedural requirements on themselves.222  In addition, courts could
police the distinction between legislative and nonlegislative rules tightly, insisting
on notice-and-comment procedures whenever an agency interpretive rule or
policy statement had significant legal or practical effect on a state.223 
Alternatively, courts could strictly enforce notice and explanation requirements,
requiring that federal agencies carefully identify and justify the preemptive or
other effects of a proposed rule on the states.224  
This latter option could have considerable practical relevance today. 
Several agencies recently have included statements in their explanation of final
rules stating that they viewed the rules as preempting state regulation and tort
actions, despite having initially stated in the notice of their proposed rule that it
225 See [CITE CPSC, NHTSA, FRA rulemakings].  Similarly, the OCC’s notice in
Watters seems unduly obscure on the question of preemption, stating simply that preemption
would exist to the same extent as under the NBA, rather than directly stating that state oversight
would actually be preempted to a large extent, 66 Fed. Reg. 8178, 8181; reigning case law at the
time provided that the NBA did not “deprive States of the power to regulate national banks, where
. . . doing so does not prevent or significantly interfere with the national bank's exercise of its
powers.”  Barnett Bank v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 33 (1996).  Although it cited in a footnote several
types of measures that would be preempted, the OCC did not include any statement to the effect
that it viewed state oversight of subsidiaries as significantly interfering with national banks’
exercise of their powers but instead emphasized the extent to which subsidiaries are equivalent to
internal divisions of banks and the authority of banks to use subsidiaries under governing law.  66
Fed Reg. at 8181. 
226 See Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 127 S.Ct. 2339, 2351 (2007) (describing
the “logical outgrowth” requirement as “one of fair notice”).  It could be argued that states and
other commentators nonetheless had “fair notice” that the agencies were considering preemption,
see id. (finding no notice violation when agency changed position during rulemaking on
substantive scope of rule), but the fact the rules in question here were addressed to substantive
topics other than preemption makes that conclusion harder to justify.  Indeed, the fact that
preemption is addressed solely in the preambles of these rules complicates assessment of whether
failure to provide adequate notice of preemption would make the final rules invalid, or simply
would justify a court in failing to grant Chevron deference to the agency’s position on preemption;
the latter would seem the correct result as an agencies’ failure to include a statement on
preemption in the body of the rule suggests it does not intend such statements to have legal force
and effect.  See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001);   See Sharkey, Preamble/PLP,
supra note _, at __ .
227 For a discussion of different forms of preemption, see Dinh, supra note , at __; Nelson,
supra note _, at __.   Preemption of state law that actually conflicts with federal regulations is not
contentious; what has sparked substantial debate is instead efforts to preempt state laws not
directly in conflict on the grounds that they create an obstacle to the federal regulatory scheme (as
in Watters), or more rarely, that federal regulation indicates an intent to occupy the field.  See
Merrill, NW L Rev.
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would not be preemptive.225  Arguably, such a reversal in position on preemption
made the original notice inadequate, because the final rule was not a “logical
outgrowth” of the proposed rule.226  Or, even if standard notice requirements were
satisfied here, courts might conclude that additional clarity is required before a
federal rule can have a preemptive effect, at least when state law is not plainly in
conflict with the rule.227 
2.  Greater Scrutiny of Agency Decisions that Burden State Interests.  A
second technique for protecting state interests, this time more evident in the five
decisions, is subjecting agency decisions that burdens state interests to greater
substantive scrutiny than usually applied.  Interestingly, the form in which this
technique most clearly appears in the decisions—specifically, the Court’s use of
independent scrutiny of statutory meaning—may be most problematic from an
agency-incentivizing perspective.  After all, why should agencies pay careful
heed to federalism concerns in interpreting statutes if courts are unlike to defer to
228  Even adoption of Skidmore may have such a deterrent effect, given that Skidmore ties
deference to the degree to which an agency has succeeded in persuading a court that the agency’s
view is correct and thus in practice may not differ much from independent scrutiny.  But as
Skidmore emphasizes the quality and reliability of agency decisions in deciding whether to defer,
adoption of Skidmore as the standard under which to review agency preemption decisions (the
approach advocated by the state in Watters) seems better keyed to influencing agency
decisionmaking than simply substituting independent judicial review.
229 It has been used in this way on significant occasions.  See, e.g., State Farm, Overton
Park, Nat’l Maritime (DC Cir).
230 See. Richard A. Epstein, Why the FDA Must Preempt Tort Litigation: A Critique of
Chevron Deference and a Response to Richard Nagareda, 1 J. Tort Law Article 5 (2006).
(Response to Nagareda); Stewart, Regulatory Compliance Richard B. Stewart, Regulatory
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their decisions?228  That said, lack of such scrutiny—and instead willingness to
apply ordinary strong Chevron deference to agency interpretations that
significantly displace state authority—could remove a powerful check on federal
agency overreaching at the states’ expense.  For this reason, as noted, some
scholars have argued against granting any deference to agency statutory
interpretations that preempt state action or at most granting lesser Skidmore
deference.
More beneficial, I believe, would be to approach the question from a
perspective that emphasizes the quality of agency reasoning and explanation. 
Agencies should face a greater burden of persuasion and explanation when their
decisions substantially restrict state experimentation and traditional state
functions.  The doctrinal rubric most amenable to such an approach is arbitrary
and capriciousness review, in part because it applies to all agency
decisionmaking, whether on matters of statutory interpretation or more
straightforward policymaking.  As a result, it avoids the odd dichotomy of
denying deference to agency preemption interpretations yet reviewing agency
substantive determinations quite deferentially, notwithstanding that the latter can
impact as harshly on the states.  Arbitrary and capriciousness review also seems
particularly well-suited to curbing agency decisions that are unduly driven by
executive branch politics at the expense of governing statutes.229  
The downside of relying on arbitrary and capriciousness review is that the
impact on agency decisionmaking is harder to cabin.  Agencies make a multitude
of policy and implementation decisions that burden the states, far more than the
number of preemptive statutory interpretations they may issue.  Imposing a
greater justificatory burden when agency decisions impact negatively on state
interests would be substantial counterbalance to any tendency on the part of
federal agencies, by virtue of their national position or presidential policy
priorities, to underweigh state interests.  But arguably it does so by tilting the
scales too much in favor of the states, at least applied across-the-board,
undermining the important uniformity and expertise benefits that federal
regulation can offer and was intended by Congress to achieve.230  This is not
Compliance Preclusion of Tort Liability: Limiting the Dual-Track System, 88 Geo. L.J. 2167
(2000); Thomas Merrill, Preemption in Environmental Law: Formalism, Federalism Theory, and
Default Rules in FEDERAL PREEMPTION, supra note _ (AEI). GET PINS
231 See Merrill, AEI, supra note _, at __; Catherine M. Sharkey & Samuel Issacharoff,
Backdoor Federalization, 53 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1353, __ (2006)
232 See, e.g., Buzbee, Contextual Environmental Federalism, supra note _; Merrill,  AEI,
supra note _ (arguing that preemption has to be approached contextually); Sharkey, PLP, supra
note _ at 33-35; see also Buzbee, NYU, supra note _ (arguing that federally preemptive floors and
ceilings should be treated differently).
233 See Peter Strauss, Overseers or “The Deciders”: The Courts in Administrative Law at
5.  Compare, e.g., State Farm (hard look review in informal rulemaking) with PGBC (deferential
review in informal adjudication context) and Baltimore Gas (greater deference in light of
uncertainty).  Thomas Miles and Cass Sunstein’s recent empirical analysis of arbitrariness review
supports this claim that arbitrary and capriciousness review encompasses a range of scrutiny,
although they trace this variation to the ideology of reviewing judges and of the underlying
decision.  See Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of Arbitrariness Review, U
Chi. L .Rev. [update cite].
234 Cf Young, Just Blowing Smoke, supra note __ .  Another example concerns federal
agency denial of state waiver requests; arguably, a federal agency should face a greater burden to
justify denial of waiver requests than it does refusal to grant private regulated entities waivers.  If
so, this could be relevant to several current disputes in which the federal government has denied
state requests for waiver authority with important federalism implications. [See, e.g., NCLB/
Connecticut denial; Cal carbon dioxide emissions denial]
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simply a question of national interests versus state interests, because national
regulation can reinforce state authority by protecting states against harmful
externalities caused by sister state regulation (or lack thereof).231   
As a result, a more contextual approach appears more appropriate, with
greater justification perhaps required only some circumstances—for example,
when the burden on states is quite significant, or when governing statutes and
historical practice have tolerated a substantial role for state regulation.232  Here
another advantage of the arbitrary and capriciousness review comes to fore, which
is that such review currently encompasses a broad range of scrutiny.  As Peter
Strauss has noted, more searching, hard look scrutiny is most common in informal
rulemakings, which produce generally-applicable standards, than in less
consequential informal adjudications.233  
Interestingly, this is the approach implicitly suggested but never
developed in Raich, and medical marijuana represents a prime context for its
application.  In light of strong state commitment to experimenting with medical
marijuana, and the CSA’s provision for rescheduling of controlled substances
based on medical purpose, the federal government should face a significant
justificatory burden if it refuses to relist marijuana or undertake a sustained
investigation of a rescheduling petition.234
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B. Ordinary or Extraordinary Administrative Law?
A final issue concerns whether administrative law’s surrogacy potential is
best enhanced by developing special requirements applicable only when agency
action impacts state interests, or instead by seeking to protect state interests from
withing the paradigms of ordinary administrative law.  Given the capaciousness
of ordinary administrative law, such special federalism-inspired rules do not seem
necessary to ensure that administrative law fosters federalism values.  Neither of
the two proposals advanced above, for example, clearly necessitates going outside
of the paradigms of ordinary administrative law.  More importantly, developing
an extraordinary administrative law for federalism contexts may in fact
undermine administrative law’s surrogacy potential, insofar as it suggests that
federalism concerns are not a legitimate focus of ordinary administrative law. 
Equally concerning, devising special federalism-inspired rules could erode the
normalizing potential of the administrative law approach, transforming it into
something more exceptional like constitutional or quasi-constitutional federalism
doctrines.
The practical import of this caution against developing extraordinary
administrative law is limited.  The distinction between extraordinary and ordinary
administrative law is hardly bright-line.  Most importantly, staying within the
broad confines of ordinary administrative does not mean foregoing express
invocation of federalism concerns in administrative law decisions.  Indeed,
express acknowledgment of the need for agencies to take state interests seriously
and of how administrative law can encourage them to do so is essential for
administrative law to fulfill its surrogacy role, and important for judicial
accountability more generally.  Such acknowledgment puts agencies on notice of
the need to take state interests seriously and allows for dialogue between agencies
and courts about how state concerns should factor into agency decisionmaking. 
In addition, unless the Supreme Court is explicit about administrative law’s role
as a federalism surrogate, the traditional view of these doctrines as analytically
separate may make lower courts resistant to injecting federalism concerns into an
administrative law rubric.  
In some ways, the federalism-administrative law quintet accords with this
caution against developing extraordinary administrative law. conclusion.  As
discussed above, ordinary administrative law surfaces in all the decisions and
none of the decisions, even Massachusetts, is clearly beyond standard
administrative law fare.  But the decisions fail significantly on the factor of
transparency.  Even when the Court emphasized the impact of federal
administrative decisions on the states, it offered little clarity on how that impact
factored into its analysis.  As a result, lower courts and agencies are left without
much guidance on how to approach intersections of federalism and administrative
law.  
Greater acknowledgment of the connection between federalism and
administrative law is as important from an administrative law perspective as from
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a federalism one.   The quintet of decisions suggests that, faced with federalism
concerns, the Court may apply more searching scrutiny and in other ways push
administrative law to its extremes.  From an administrative law perspective, the
danger is that these more extreme approaches will spillover into contexts when
federalism concerns are absent.  Again, the capaciousness of ordinary
administrative law means that these approaches are generally available, so such
spillover does not entail that much of a doctrinal shift.  And the more frequently
they are invoked, the more these approaches move from the margin to the core of
established administrative law analysis.  This suggests that, viewed purely from
an agency-centered perspective, developing special requirements limited to
federalism contexts might be preferable to reliance on ordinary administrative law
to address federalism concerns.  At a minimum, express discussion of how
federalism concerns factor into a court’s application of ordinary administrative
law requirements is important to limit such spillover effects.
CONCLUSION
[To be added.]
